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A	  central	  prediction	  of	  information	  economics	  is	  that	  market	  forces	  can	  lead	  businesses	  
to	   voluntarily	   provide	   information	   about	   the	   quality	   of	   their	   products,	   yet	   little	  
voluntary	   disclosure	   is	   observed	   in	   the	   field.	   In	   this	   paper,	   we	   demonstrate	   that	   the	  
inconsistency	  between	  theory	  and	  reality	  is	  driven	  by	  a	  fundamental	  failure	  in	  consumer	  
inferences	  when	  sellers	  withhold	  information.	  Using	  a	  series	  of	  laboratory	  experiments,	  
we	  implement	  a	  simple	  disclosure	  game	  in	  which	  senders	  can	  verifiably	  report	  quality	  to	  
receivers.	   We	   find	   that	   senders	   disclose	   less	   often	   than	   equilibrium	   would	   predict.	  
Receivers	   are	   not	   sufficiently	   skeptical	   about	   undisclosed	   information	   –	   they	  
underestimate	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   no	   news	   is	   bad	   news.	   Senders	   generally	   take	  
advantage	  of	  receiver	  mistakes.	  We	  find	  that	  providing	  disclosure	  rates	  by	  quality	  score	  
helps	  to	  improve	  receiver	  inferences.	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1 Introduction	  
Across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  settings,	  sellers	  have	  private	  information	  about	  the	  quality	  of	  
the	  goods	  and	  services	  they	  sell.	  Restaurant	  owners	  know	  the	  results	  from	  their	  hygiene	  
inspections.	   Car	   manufacturers	   know	   the	   gas	   mileage	   of	   their	   cars.	   Salad	   dressing	  
companies	   know	   how	  many	   calories	   their	   dressings	   contain.	   Truth-­‐in-­‐advertising	   laws	  
stipulate	   that	   companies	   cannot	   provide	   misleading	   or	   incorrect	   information	   to	  
customers.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	   information	   they	  provide	  must	  be	  verifiable.	  However,	  
businesses	   can	   often	   decide	  whether	   to	   provide	   such	   information	   to	   buyers.	  When	   a	  
business	   chooses	   not	   to	   disclose	   information,	   customers	  must	   then	   infer	  whether	   no	  
news	  is	  bad	  news	  or	  good	  news.2	  
Theories	  of	  voluntary	  disclosure,	  dating	  back	  to	  Viscusi	   (1978),	  Grossman	  and	  Hart	  
(1980),	  Grossman	  (1981),	  and	  Milgrom	  (1981)	  suggest	  that	  market	  forces	  can	  drive	  firms	  
to	   voluntarily	   and	   completely	   reveal	   information	   about	   their	   quality	   when	   such	  
information	   is	   verifiable	   and	   the	   costs	   of	   verification	   and	   disclosure	   are	   low.	   The	  
mechanism	  behind	  these	  results	   is	  simple.	  Consumers	  treat	  all	  non-­‐reporting	  firms	  the	  
same,	   so	   the	   highest	   quality	   non-­‐reporting	   firms	   have	   an	   incentive	   to	   separate	  
themselves	   through	   disclosure.	   Applied	   iteratively,	   this	   logic	   produces	   “unraveling”	   in	  
the	  quality	  of	  non-­‐reporting	  firms,	  so	  that	   in	  equilibrium	  consumers	  correctly	   infer	  the	  
very	  worst	  when	  information	  is	  not	  disclosed.	  
Voluntary	  disclosure	   is	  appealing	   from	  a	  policy	  perspective	  because	   it	  can	   improve	  
consumer	  welfare	  even	  without	  mandatory	  disclosure	  policies,	  which	  are	  often	  opposed	  
by	   industry	   groups	   and	   challenging	   to	   implement	   and	   enforce.	   The	   unraveling	   result	  
suggests	   that	   the	   same	   benefits	   can	   be	   achieved	   simply	   by	   ensuring	   that	   disclosed	  
information	   is	   verifiable	   and	   the	   related	   costs	   are	   low.	   This	   has	   inspired	   a	   number	   of	  
measures,	  including	  standardized	  information	  displays,	  certification	  agencies,	  and	  truth-­‐
in-­‐advertising	  laws.	  
In	   practice,	   voluntary	   disclosure	   is	   observed	   in	   many	   industries,	   but	   is	   far	   from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See	  DellaVigna	  and	  Gentzkow	  (2010)	  for	  a	  general	  review	  of	  persuasive	  
communication.	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complete	   (see	  Mathios	  2000,	   Jin	  2005,	  Fung	  et	  al.	  2007,	  and	  Luca	  and	  Smith	  2015	   for	  
specific	  examples).	  As	  summarized	   in	  Dranove	  and	   Jin	   (2010),	   this	   incompleteness	  has	  
motivated	   two	  strands	  of	   theories	   to	  account	   for	  why	  unraveling	  does	  not	  occur.	  One	  
strand	  emphasizes	  external	   factors:	   it	  may	  be	   costly	   for	   sellers	   to	   collect	   and	  disclose	  
information	   to	   the	   public,	   consumers	   may	   already	   know	   information	   from	   other	  
channels,	   or	   it	   may	   be	   difficult	   to	   disclose	   the	   information	   in	   a	   format	   that	   is	  
comprehensible	   to	   consumers.	   The	   second	   strand	   focuses	   on	   a	   seller’s	   strategic	  
incentives:	   sellers	  may	  choose	  not	   to	  obtain	  data	  on	  product	  quality	   in	  order	   to	  avoid	  
future	   demand	   for	   disclosure	   (Matthews	   and	   Postlewaite	   1985),	   a	   desire	   for	   product	  
differentiation	  may	  dominate	  disclosure	  incentives	  (Board	  2009),	  and	  when	  the	  quality	  
information	  is	  coarse,	  sellers	  of	  best	  quality	  may	  use	  non-­‐disclosure	  as	  a	  counter-­‐signal	  
to	   distinguish	   themselves	   from	   eager-­‐to-­‐disclose	   medium-­‐quality	   sellers	   (Feltovich,	  
Harbaugh,	  and	  To	  2002).	  The	  seller’s	  strategic	   incentive	  can	  also	  be	  dynamic:	  one	  may	  
refrain	   from	  disclosure	  even	   if	   he	  has	   favorable	   information	  at	  hand,	   as	  he	   fears	   that	  
today’s	  disclosure	  may	  make	  it	  harder	  to	  explain	  non-­‐disclosure	  in	  the	  future	  when	  the	  
information	   turns	   out	   non-­‐favorable	   (Grubb	   2011).	   In	   another	   example	   of	   dynamic	  
incentives,	  a	  pharmaceutical	  firm	  may	  prefer	  to	  be	  silent	  about	  the	  potential	  health	  risks	  
of	   its	   products	   because	   of	   litigation	   risk,	   but	   this	  may	   crowd	   out	   positive	   disclosures	  
(Marinovic	  and	  Varas	  2015).	  
In	  this	  paper,	  we	  show	  that	  information	  fails	  to	  unravel	  even	  after	  we	  strip	  away	  all	  
the	  above-­‐mentioned	  factors	  in	  a	  well-­‐controlled	  laboratory	  setting.	  In	  fact,	  our	  results	  
suggest	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  voluntary	  disclosure	  we	  observe	  in	  the	  field	  may	  be	  explained	  by	  
a	  more	  fundamental	  reason.	  A	  crucial	  element	  for	  unraveling	  to	  occur	  is	  that	  consumers	  
need	   to	   correctly	   infer	   the	  quality	  of	  non-­‐disclosing	   firms	  –	   to	   correctly	   identify	  when	  
“no	   news	   is	   bad	   news”	   –	   and	   our	   experiment	   indicates	   that	   consumers	   may	  
underestimate	  the	  extent	   to	  which	  no	  news	   is	  bad	  news.	  The	  resulting	  opportunity	   to	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mislead	   consumers	   can	   incentivize	   firms	   to	   withhold	   information	   more	   often	   than	   is	  
predicted	  by	  equilibrium.3	  
In	  the	  setting	  we	  study,	  there	  are	  two	  players:	  an	  information	  sender	  (e.g.,	  the	  firm)	  
and	   an	   information	   receiver	   (e.g.,	   the	   consumer).	   The	   sender	   receives	   private	  
information	   that	   perfectly	   identifies	   the	   true	   state	   (e.g.,	   the	   firm’s	   true	   quality	   level).	  
The	  sender	  then	  makes	  a	  single	  decision:	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  disclose	  this	  information	  to	  
the	   receiver.	  As	  a	   result,	   the	   sender	  cannot	  misrepresent	   the	  state.	  This	   is	   in	   contrast	  
with	   existing	   experiments	   on	   strategic	   information	   transmission	   (Cai	   and	  Wang	   2006,	  
Wang,	  Spezio,	  and	  Camerer	  2011),	  where	  senders	  can	  engage	  in	  “cheap	  talk”.4	  
After	   the	   sender	  decides	  whether	  or	  not	   to	  disclose	   their	   private	   information,	   the	  
receiver	  must	  guess	  the	  state.5	  If	  the	  sender	  has	  revealed	  the	  state	  through	  disclosure,	  
then	  this	  task	  is	  trivial	  –	  the	  receiver	  knows	  the	  true	  state	  with	  certainty.	  If	  the	  sender	  
has	  not	   revealed	   the	  state,	   then	   the	   receiver	  must	   infer	   it	  based	  only	  on	   the	  sender’s	  
decision	  not	  to	  disclose.	  However,	  the	  receiver	  also	  knows	  the	  distribution	  of	  states	  and	  
that	   the	  sender	  has	  private	   information.	  The	  sender	  and	   receiver	  do	  not	  have	  aligned	  
interests:	   the	   sender	   has	   higher	   earnings	  when	   the	   receiver	   guesses	   that	   the	   state	   is	  
higher	   (guesses	   and	   states	   are	   numeric	   values),	   and	   the	   receiver	   has	   higher	   earnings	  
when	  his	  or	  her	  guess	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  true	  state.	  
The	  unique	  sequential	  equilibrium	  of	  this	  game	  can	  be	  found	  with	  a	  straightforward	  
application	  of	  the	  unraveling	  arguments	  mentioned	  previously.	   In	  equilibrium,	  senders	  
always	   reveal	   their	   information	   (unless	   the	   state	   takes	   the	   lowest	   possible	   value,	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Brown,	  Camerer,	  and	  Lovallo	  (2012)	  find	  that	  consumers	  fail	  to	  appreciate	  the	  extent	  
to	  which	  a	  “cold	  opening”	  is	  bad	  news	  about	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  film.	  4	  Only	  a	  handful	  of	  papers	  have	  studied	  verifiable	  information	  disclosure	  in	  the	  lab.	  Most	  
of	  these	  studies	  (for	  example,	  Forsythe	  et	  al.	  1989,	  King	  and	  Wallin	  1991,	  and	  Dickhaut	  
et	  al.	  2003),	  are	  motivated	  by	  disclosure	  in	  asset	  markets,	  so	  their	  experimental	  designs	  
are	   substantially	   different	   from	   ours.	   For	   example,	   they	   have	   receivers	   compete	  with	  
each	  other	  through	  an	  auction	  mechanism,	  which	   introduces	  room	  for	  other	  biases	  to	  
drive	   receiver	   choices.	   See	   section	   3	   for	   a	   comparison	   of	   our	   experiment	   with	   other	  
related	  experiments.	  	  5	  Guessing	  the	  state	  is	  analogous	  to	  deciding	  how	  many	  units	  to	  purchase,	  as	  in	  Milgrom	  
(1981).	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which	   case	   they	   are	   indifferent	   between	   revealing	   and	   not),	   and	   receivers	   correctly	  
guess	   that	   the	   state	   takes	   the	   lowest	   possible	   value	  when	   senders	   do	   not	   reveal	   this	  
information.	  
When	   we	   implement	   this	   game	   in	   the	   laboratory,	   we	   find	   widespread	   failures	   of	  
unraveling,	   despite	   the	   simplicity	   of	   the	   strategic	   interaction.	   Senders	   do	   not	   fully	  
disclose	  the	  state,	  and	  receivers	  are	  not	  fully	  skeptical	  about	  non-­‐disclosure.	  To	  ensure	  
that	   participants	   understand	   the	   game,	   we	   allow	   participants	   to	   play	   for	   45	   rounds	  
(being	  randomly	  re-­‐matched	  with	  a	  different,	  anonymous	  partner	  in	  each	  round)	  and	  to	  
play	   both	   roles	   (being	   randomly	   assigned	   a	   role	   in	   each	   round),	   but	   the	   failures	   of	  
unraveling	  we	  observe	  are	  persistent.	  	  
We	  find	  that	  most	  receivers	  consistently	  guess	  higher	  than	  predicted	  by	  equilibrium	  
and	   that	   many	   receivers	   guess	   far	   higher	   than	   the	   average	   non-­‐disclosed	   state.	   We	  
present	   evidence	   that	   these	   high	   guesses	   result	   from	   poor	   inferences	   on	   the	   part	   of	  
receivers	  and	  provide	  robustness	  tests	  to	  rule	  out	  alternative	  explanations,	  such	  as	  risk	  
aversion,	  social	  preferences,	  and	  random	  choice	  errors.	  	  
These	  overestimates	  cause	  a	  breakdown	  in	  the	  logic	  of	  unraveling	  because	  senders	  
with	   relatively	   favorable	   information	  do	  not	  have	  an	   incentive	   to	  disclose	  more	  often.	  
We	   investigate	   several	   ways	   to	   increase	   sender	   incentives	   to	   disclose	   by	   improving	  
receiver	  inferences.	  Clearly,	  one	  option	  is	  simply	  to	  tell	  receivers	  the	  sender’s	  true	  type	  
after	  each	  round.	  While	  we	  implement	  this	  experimentally	  and	  find	  it	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  
method,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  realistic	  policy	  intervention	  for	  most	  settings	  of	  interest.	  For	  example,	  
it	  would	  be	  a	  strange	  policy	   initiative	  to	  tell	  all	  consumers	  the	  actual	  hygiene	  grade	  of	  
the	  restaurant	  after	  they	  eat	  their	  meal.	  	  
We	   implement	   two	   other	   interventions	   that	   do	   correspond	   to	   feasible	   policy	  
initiatives.	  First,	  we	  tell	  receivers	  the	  average	  state	  when	  senders	  chose	  to	  disclose	  (as	  
opposed	   to	  when	   they	   chose	   to	  withhold).	   This	   contains	   some	   information	   about	   the	  
strategies	   of	   senders;	   however,	  we	   find	   that	   it	   does	   not	   affect	   receiver	   beliefs	   or	   the	  
rates	  of	  disclosure.	  Second,	  we	  tell	  receivers	  the	  fraction	  of	  senders	  who	  chose	  to	  report	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and	  not	  report	  for	  each	  state.	  We	  find	  that	  this	  intervention	  leads	  to	  improved	  guesses	  
on	  the	  part	  of	  receivers	  and	  higher	  rates	  of	  disclosure	  on	  the	  part	  of	  senders.	  
Overall,	   our	   lab	   experiments	   demonstrate	   that	   allowing	   sellers	   to	   verifiably	   and	  
costlessly	   disclose	   information	   about	   product	   quality	   is	   not	   sufficient	   for	   unraveling	  
because	  customers	  do	  not	  sufficiently	  interpret	  the	  negative	  signal	  of	  non-­‐disclosure.	  As	  
a	  result,	  a	  critical	  question	   is	  how	  to	  educate	  consumers	  so	  that	  they	  will	   interpret	  no	  
news	  as	  bad	  news.	  Our	  experiments	  have	  shown	  that	  a	  simple	  summary	  of	  disclosure	  
rates	  by	  quality	   score	  may	  go	  a	   long	  way	   towards	  overcoming	   incorrect	  buyer	  beliefs.	  
Kessler	   and	   Roth	   (2012)	   argue	   that	   laboratory	   experiments	   can	   be	   used	   as	   a	   starting	  
point	   for	   policy	   interventions,	   and	  we	  hope	  our	   laboratory	   experiments	   can	   form	   the	  
starting	  point	  for	  new	  policies	  aimed	  at	  increasing	  voluntary	  disclosure.	  	  
The	   rest	   of	   the	   paper	   is	   organized	   as	   follows.	   Section	   2	   describes	   the	   disclosure	  
game,	   section	   3	   provides	   details	   on	   how	   we	   implement	   this	   game	   with	   laboratory	  
experiments,	   section	   4	   reports	   the	   experimental	   results,	   and	   section	   5	   presents	   an	  
additional	   experiment	   used	   to	   test	   the	   robustness	   of	   our	   results,	   and	   section	   6	  
concludes	  with	  policy	  implications.	  
	  
2	   The	  Disclosure	  Game	  
The	   one-­‐shot	   disclosure	   game	   we	   study	   involves	   two	   agents:	   a	   sender	   and	   a	  
receiver.	   At	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   game,	   nature	   determines	   the	   state	   s	   (which	   can	   be	  
interpreted	  as	  the	  sender’s	  type)	  by	  taking	  a	  draw	  from	  a	  probability	  distribution	  F	  with	  
full	  support	  over	  a	  finite	  state	  space	  S,	  which	  is	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  real	  numbers.	  The	  sender	  
knows	   the	   realized	   state,	   but	   ex-­‐ante,	   the	   receiver	   knows	   only	   the	   distribution	   of	  
possible	  states.	  
The	   sender	  has	   two	  possible	  actions,	   and	   the	   receiver	   is	   aware	   that	   these	  are	   the	  
only	  two	  actions	  available	  to	  the	  sender.	  The	  sender	  can	  either	  report	  the	  state	  to	  the	  
receiver	  or	  make	  no	  report.	  This	  report	  must	  be	  truthful	  and	  cannot	  be	  vague.	  Thus,	  the	  
set	  of	  actions	  M	  available	  to	  a	  sender	  of	  type	  s	  is	  just	  M(s)={s,null}.	  	  
Regardless	   of	  whether	   or	   not	   they	   receive	   a	   report	   from	   the	   sender,	   the	   receiver	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takes	  an	  action	  a	  from	  a	  finite	  space	  A,	  which	  is	  also	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  real	  numbers	  and	  
contains	  S.	  We	  interpret	  this	  action	  as	  guessing	  the	  type	  of	  the	  sender.	  We	  could	  have	  
considered	  a	  setting	  where	  the	  receiver’s	  action	  is	  to	  choose	  a	  quantity	  to	  purchase	  (as	  
in	  Milgrom	  1981),	  but	  this	  would	  have	  added	  more	  complication	  to	  the	  game.	  
The	  true	  state	  and	  receiver’s	  action	  determine	  the	  payoffs	  for	  the	  two	  parties.	  The	  
sender’s	   utility	   is	   given	   by	   a	   function	  𝑈!(𝑎) ,	   which	   is	   concave	   and	   monotonically	  
increasing	  in	  the	  receiver’s	  action	  and	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  receiver’s	  utility	  
is	  given	  by	  a	  function	  𝑈!(𝑎, 𝑠),	  which	  is	  concave	  in	  the	  receiver’s	  action	  and	  reaches	  its	  
peak	  when	  a	  is	  equal	  to	  s.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  receiver	  benefits	  the	  most	  from	  selecting	  
an	   action	   that	   is	   as	   close	   as	   possible	   to	   the	   true	   state,	  while	   the	   sender	   benefits	   the	  
most	  when	  the	  receiver’s	  action	  is	  as	  high	  as	  possible.	  These	  utility	  functions	  produce	  a	  
strong	  conflict	  of	  interest	  when	  the	  state	  is	  low.	  
The	  techniques	  found	  in	  Milgrom	  (1981)	  can	  be	  easily	  adapted	  to	  show	  that	  in	  every	  
sequential	   equilibrium	   of	   this	   disclosure	   game,	   the	   sender	   always	   reports	   the	   state	  
(unless	  it	  is	  the	  minimum	  element	  in	  S),	  and	  if	  there	  is	  no	  report,	  the	  receiver	  takes	  the	  
action	  that	  is	  the	  minimum	  element	  in	  S.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  sender	  always	  reports	  his	  
or	  her	   type	   (unless	   it	   is	   the	  worst	  possible	   type),	   and	   the	   receiver	  always	  guesses	   the	  
sender	   is	   the	  worst	  possible	  type	   if	   they	  do	  not	  report.	  When	  the	  realized	  state	   is	   the	  
minimum	   element	   in	   S,	   the	   sender	   is	   indifferent	   between	   reporting	   or	   not,	   so	   any	  
mixture	  over	  these	  actions	  is	  consistent	  with	  equilibrium.	  
There	  are	  other	  Bayesian	  Nash	  equilibria	  of	  this	  game,	  but	  they	  require	  strategies	  to	  
contain	  non-­‐rational	  behavior	  off	  of	  the	  equilibrium	  path.	  For	  instance,	  there	  can	  exist	  a	  
Nash	  equilibrium	   in	  which	  sellers	  never	   report	  and	  receivers	   take	   the	  action	   that	   is	  as	  
close	   to	   the	   average	   realization	  of	   the	   state	   space	   as	   possible.	   This	   is	   supported	  by	   a	  
receiver	  strategy	  in	  which	  the	  action	  equal	  to	  the	  minimum	  element	  of	  the	  state	  space	  is	  
taken	   if	   the	  sender	  does	   report.	  However,	   it	  would	  not	  be	  optimal	   for	   the	   receiver	   to	  
take	  this	  action	   if	   the	  state	  was	  reported	  and	   it	  was	  not	   the	  minimum	  element	  of	   the	  
state	  space.	  Importantly,	  we	  do	  not	  observe	  behavior	  consistent	  with	  any	  of	  these	  other	  
Bayesian	  Nash	  equilibria.	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Finally,	  we	  think	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  consider	  disclosure	  games	  where	  there	  is	  
more	   than	   one	   sender	   or	   receiver,	   where	   there	   is	  more	   than	   one	   period,	   where	   the	  
sender	  is	  potentially	  uninformed	  about	  the	  true	  state,	  where	  the	  sender	  also	  has	  access	  
to	  vague	  or	  untruthful	  messages,	  or	  where	  the	  sender’s	  preferences	  are	  not	  monotonic	  
in	   the	   receiver’s	   action.	  However,	   our	   aim	   is	   to	   study	   the	   simplest	   possible	   setting	  of	  
verifiable	  disclosure	  where	  unraveling	  is	  predicted	  to	  generate	  voluntary	  disclosure,	  so	  
we	  leave	  these	  extensions	  for	  future	  work.	  
	  
3	  	   Experimental	  Design	  
In	   our	   experiment,	   subjects	   completed	   45	   rounds	   and	   then,	   depending	   on	   the	  
session,	  one	  of	  seven	  possible	  additional	   tasks.	  Subjects	  were	   told	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	  
the	  experiment	  that	  they	  would	  complete	  an	  additional	  task,	  but	  were	  given	  no	  details	  
about	  the	  task.	  See	  the	  appendix	  for	  the	  full	  set	  of	  instructions	  given	  before	  start	  of	  the	  
experiment.	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  each	  session,	  subjects	  were	  paid,	  privately	  and	  in	  cash,	  their	  show-­‐up	  
fee	   plus	   any	   additional	   earnings	   from	   the	   experiment.	   Over	   the	   course	   of	   the	  
experiment,	  subjects	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  accumulate	  or	  lose	  “Experimental	  Currency	  
Units”	  (or	  ECU).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  each	  subject’s	  ECU	  balance	  was	  rounded	  
up	  to	  the	  nearest	  non-­‐negative	  multiple	  of	  200	  and	  converted	  into	  U.S.	  dollars	  at	  a	  rate	  
of	  200	  to	  1.	  	  
	  
3.1	  In	  Each	  Round	  
In	  each	  round,	  subjects	  were	  randomly	  matched	   into	  pairs.	  To	  reduce	  reputational	  
effects,	   subjects	   were	   matched	   anonymously	   and	   told	   that	   it	   was	   very	   unlikely	   they	  
would	  be	  paired	  with	  the	  same	  subject	  in	  consecutive	  rounds.	  For	  a	  session	  size	  of	  14,	  
the	   actual	   likelihood	   of	   being	   paired	   with	   the	   same	   subject	   in	   consecutive	   rounds	   is	  
0.6%.	  
In	   each	   round	  and	   for	   each	  pairing,	   one	   subject	  was	   randomly	   assigned	   to	  be	   the	  
sender,	   and	   the	   other	   subject	   was	   randomly	   assigned	   to	   be	   the	   receiver.	   Each	   was	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equally	   likely	   to	   be	   assigned	   either	   role.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   likelihood	   of	   a	   subject	  
experiencing	  both	  roles	  by	  round	  5	  is	  93.75%.	  We	  used	  alternating	  roles	  to	  ensure	  that	  
receivers	   understood	   that	   senders	   could	   not	   misreport	   the	   state.	   To	   reduce	   framing	  
effects,	  the	  sender	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “S	  Player,”	  and	  the	  receiver	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  
the	  “R	  Player.”	  
For	  each	  pair,	  the	  computer	  drew	  a	  whole	  number	  from	  1	  to	  5,	  called	  the	  “secret”	  
number.	   Thus,	   the	   state	   space	  was	   S={1,2,3,4,5}.	   Each	   of	   these	   numbers	  was	   equally	  
likely	  to	  be	  drawn,	  and	  both	  senders	  and	  receivers	  were	  made	  aware	  of	  this	  probability	  
distribution	  over	  the	  state	  space.	  
Each	   sender	  was	   shown	   the	   secret	   number	   for	   their	   pairing	   and	   then	  made	   their	  
decision	  while	  the	  receivers	  waited.	  Senders	  were	  given	  the	  option	  to	  either	  “report”	  or	  
“skip”,	  with	  no	  time	  limit	  on	  their	  decision.	  
Once	  all	  senders	  had	  made	  their	  decisions,	  the	  receivers’	  screens	  became	  active.	  If	  a	  
sender	  decided	  to	  report	  their	  secret	  number,	  the	  receiver	  they	  were	  paired	  with	  was	  
shown	  this	  message:	  “The	  number	  I	  received	  is,”	  followed	  by	  the	  actual	  secret	  number.	  
If	   a	   sender	   decided	   instead	   to	   skip	   any	   reporting,	   the	   area	   for	   messages	   on	   the	  
receiver’s	  screen	  was	  left	  blank.	  Subjects	  were	  told	  that	  these	  were	  the	  only	  two	  actions	  
available	  to	  senders,	  and	  that	  if	  the	  area	  for	  messages	  on	  the	  receiver’s	  screen	  was	  left	  
blank,	  it	  was	  because	  the	  sender	  did	  not	  report	  the	  secret	  number.	  
Below	  the	  area	  for	  messages,	  receivers	  were	  asked	  to	  guess	  the	  secret	  number,	  and	  
these	   guesses	   could	   be	   any	   half	   unit	   between	   1	   and	   5.	   Thus,	   the	   set	   of	   actions	   is	  
A={1,1.5,2,2.5,3,3.5,4,4.5,5}.	   The	   actions	   of	   receivers	   were	   limited	   to	   half	   unit	  
increments	  so	  that	  payoffs	  could	  be	  represented	  in	  a	  table.	  There	  was	  also	  no	  time	  limit	  
for	  receiver	  decisions	  either.	  
Receiver	   payoffs	   in	   each	   round	   were	  𝐸𝐶𝑈! = 110− 20 𝑆 − 𝐴 !.!,	   where	   S	   is	   the	  
secret	  number	  and	  A	  is	  the	  receiver’s	  guess.	  These	  payoffs	  are	  such	  that	  a	  risk	  neutral	  
receiver	  would	   guess	   closest	   to	   their	   expected	   value	  of	   the	   secret	   number.	   The	  exact	  
sender	   payoffs	   in	   each	   round	   were	  𝐸𝐶𝑈! = 110− 20|5− 𝐴|!.! .	   These	   payoffs	   are	  
independent	  of	  the	  secret	  number	  and	  monotonically	   increasing	  with	  receiver	  actions,	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because	  guesses	  could	  not	  be	  higher	  than	  5.	  Because	  there	  was	  a	  small	  number	  of	  states	  
and	   actions,	   the	   payoffs	   could	   be	   shown	   in	   a	   table,	   so	   that	   subjects	   did	   not	   need	   to	  
know	  or	  interpret	  these	  functional	  forms.	  	  
With	   these	  payoff	   functions,	   there	  was	   a	   clear	  misalignment	   of	   interests	   between	  
senders	  and	  receivers.	  Receiver	  payoffs	  were	  higher	  when	  their	  guesses	  were	  closer	  to	  
the	   secret	   number,	   and	   sender	   payoffs	   were	   higher	   when	   the	   receiver	   made	   higher	  
guesses.	  Subjects	  were	  told	  these	  two	  broad	  features	  of	  sender	  and	  receiver	  payoffs.	  	  
As	   possible	   extensions	   of	   this	   experiment,	   it	   might	   be	   interesting	   to	   consider	  
different	  prior	  probabilities	  of	  each	  state,	  a	  larger	  state	  space,	  or	  a	  finer	  grid	  of	  actions.	  
However,	  our	  goal	  was	  to	  keep	  the	  design	  of	  our	  experiment	  as	  simple	  as	  possible,	  so	  as	  
to	  isolate	  the	  strategic	  tension	  of	  interest.	  
	  
3.2	  Between	  and	  Across	  Periods	  
We	  used	   the	   payoff	   functions	   described	   above	   because	   they	   produce	   the	   desired	  
strategic	   tensions,	   but	   also	   because	   they	   produce	   reasonable	   final	   payoffs.	   We	   paid	  
subjects	  cumulatively	  for	  their	  decisions	  in	  every	  round,	  which	  could	  result	  in	  deliberate	  
variation	  in	  play	  (often	  called	  a	  “portfolio”	  strategy).	  However,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  of	  
such	  behavior	  in	  our	  experiments	  or	  in	  experiments	  that	  use	  the	  same	  payoff	  functions	  
and	  also	  pay	  cumulatively	  (such	  as	  Wang,	  Spezio,	  and	  Camerer	  2010).	  
Also,	  we	  did	  not	  provide	  feedback	  after	  each	  round	  about	  the	  actual	  secret	  number	  
in	   that	   round,	   about	   the	   receiver’s	   guess	   in	   that	   round,	   or	   about	   the	   payoffs	   in	   that	  
round.	   Excluding	   such	   feedback	   is	   an	   important	   and	   intentional	   aspect	   of	   our	  
experimental	  design.	  We	  did	  this	  to	  mirror	  many	  of	  the	  settings	  in	  which	  voluntary	  and	  
verifiable	  disclosure	  is	  studied	  in	  the	  field.	  In	  some	  cases,	  consumers	  only	  have	  limited	  
experience	  in	  a	  market,	  so	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  chance	  to	  acquire	  feedback.	  In	  others,	  
consumers	   have	   long	   experience	   but	   get	   little	   or	   very	   noisy	   feedback	   about	   non-­‐
reported	  product	  quality.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  salad	  dressing	  nutritional	  labels,	  it	  
would	  be	  difficult	   for	  a	  consumer	   to	  know	  that	   they	  have	  eaten	  a	   salad	  dressing	  with	  
inferior	  nutritional	  characteristics.	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3.3	  Related	  Experiments	  
Our	  design	  borrows	  many	  features	  from	  the	  cheap	  talk	  experiments	  of	  Cai	  and	  Wang	  
(2006)	   and	  Wang,	   Spezio,	   and	   Camerer	   (2010).	   For	   instance,	  we	   follow	  both	   of	   these	  
experiments	   in	   describing	   the	   sender’s	   type	   using	   “secret”	   numbers	   and	   in	   starting	  
messages	   to	   the	   receiver	  with	  “The	  number	   I	   received	   is.”	   In	  addition,	  our	   type	  space	  
and	  payoffs	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  found	  in	  Wang,	  Spezio,	  and	  Camerer	  (2010).	  
However,	   there	   is	   one	   substantial	   difference	   in	   our	   experimental	   design:	   in	   our	  
experiment,	  the	  sender’s	  messages	  must	  be	  truthful.	  This	  is	  why	  our	  experiment	  is	  a	  test	  
of	  verifiable	  disclosure,	  and	  their	  experiments	  are	  tests	  of	  cheap	  talk.	  
There	  are	  only	  a	   limited	  number	  of	  experiments	  that	  test	  verifiable	  disclosure,	  and	  
as	  discussed	  in	  the	  introduction,	  there	  are	  important	  differences	  between	  the	  designs	  of	  
these	  experiments	  and	  ours.	  
Three	  of	  these	  papers	  (Forsythe,	  Isaac,	  and	  Palfrey	  1989,	  King	  and	  Wallin	  1991,	  and	  
Dickhaut,	  Ledyard,	  Mukherji,	  and	  Sapra	  2003)	  are	  focused	  on	  disclosure	  in	  asset	  markets	  
(as	  in	  Milgrom	  and	  Roberts	  1986).	  These	  experiments	  feature	  a	  sender	  (the	  asset	  seller)	  
who	  decides	  whether	  to	  disclose	  the	  assets	  quality	  to	  receivers	  who	  compete	  with	  each	  
other	   through	   an	   auction	   mechanism.	   Forsythe,	   Isaac,	   and	   Palfrey	   (1989)	   find	  
“unravelling	  of	  both	   the	  prices	  paid	   for	  blind-­‐bid	   items	  and	   the	  quality	   levels	  of	   these	  
items”.	   King	   and	   Wallin	   (1991)	   and	   Dickhaut,	   Ledyard,	   Mukherji,	   and	   Sapra	   (2003)	  
complement	  these	  findings	  by	  also	  showing	  what	  happens	  when	  there	  is	  the	  possibility	  
that	  senders	  may	  not	  be	  informed	  about	  the	  asset’s	  quality.	  The	  latter	  goes	  beyond	  the	  
first	  by	  considering	  both	  partially	  informed	  senders	  and	  partially	  informative	  messages.	  
As	  mentioned	  previously,	  these	  experiments	  represent	  a	  valuable	  test	  of	  disclosure	  
in	  asset	  markets,	  but	  they	  are	  less	  applicable	  to	  our	  settings	  of	  interest.	  Also,	  the	  use	  of	  
auctions	  introduces	  the	  room	  for	  other	  biases	  to	  drive	  disclosure	  decisions,	  particularly	  
since	  these	  experiments	  used	  first-­‐price	  auctions.	  
In	  addition,	  Forsythe,	  Lundholm,	  and	  Rietz	  (1999)	  compare	  disclosure	  to	  cheap	  talk	  
in	   reducing	   adverse	   selection.	   Their	   verifiable	   disclosure	   treatment	   differs	   from	   our	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experiments	  in	  that	  receivers	  have	  a	  more	  complicated	  choice	  (what	  price	  to	  ask	  for	  the	  
product),	   and	   senders	   can	   choose	   not	   to	   take	   that	   price.	   They	   too	   find	   that	   reports	  
converge	  to	  full	  unraveling.	  
Concurrent	   to	   our	   study	   are	   three	   new	   papers	   that	   use	   experiments	   to	   study	  
verifiable	   disclosure.	   Bhattacharya,	   Kang,	   and	   Wilson	   (2015)	   aim	   to	   more	   closely	  
compare	   disclosure	   to	   cheap	   talk,	   and	   they	   allow	   senders	   to	   disclose	   an	   interval	   of	  
states.	  Benndorf,	  Kübler,	  and	  Normann	  (2015)	  study	  a	  disclosure	  game	  in	  a	  labor	  market	  
setting	  where	  multiple	   senders	  compete	   through	   the	  use	  of	  disclosure,	  but	  unlike	  our	  
experiments,	  the	  receiver	  is	  a	  computer	  who	  uses	  an	  automated	  strategy,	  so	  there	  is	  no	  
room	  for	   inference	  problems.	  Hagenbach	  and	  Perez-­‐Richet	   (2015)	   investigate	  a	  simple	  
verifiable	   disclosure	   game	   where	   sender	   payoffs	   are	   not	   necessarily	   monotonic,	   but	  
feature	  incentives	  for	  senders	  to	  masquerade	  as	  another	  type.	  
In	   two	  experiments	   that	   study	   lying	   aversion,	   senders	   have	   three	  options:	   tell	   the	  
truth,	  lie,	  or	  not	  disclose.	  Non-­‐disclosure	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  vague	  messages	  in	  the	  case	  
of	   Serra-­‐Garcia,	   van	   Damme,	   and	   Potters	   (2011)	   and	   silence	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Sanchez-­‐
Pages	  and	  Vorsatz	  (2009),	  so	  the	  latter	  is	  closer	  to	  our	  experiment.	  However,	  unlike	  our	  
experiment,	   in	   Sanchez-­‐Pages	   and	   Vorsatz	   (2009)	   non-­‐disclosure	   carries	   a	   cost.	   Even	  
with	   this	   cost,	   some	   senders	   choose	   not	   to	   disclose.	   Serra-­‐Garcia,	   van	   Damme,	   and	  
Potters	   (2011)	   find	   that	   intermediate	   senders	   sometimes	   use	   vague	  messages,	   which	  
receivers	  do	  not	  make	  correct	  inferences	  about.	  Agranov	  and	  Schotter	  (2012)	  also	  study	  
the	  use	  of	  vague	  language	  but	  focus	  on	  the	  vagueness	  possible	  with	  human	  language.	  
One	   substantial	   difference	   between	   our	   design	   and	   the	   design	   of	   the	   existing	  
voluntary	   disclosure	   experiments	   is	   that	   we	   do	   not	   provide	   full	   feedback	   after	   each	  
round.	  As	  we	  will	  describe	  in	  more	  detail	  later,	  we	  conducted	  an	  additional	  experiment	  
in	  which	  full	  feedback	  was	  provided,	  and	  consistent	  with	  much	  of	  the	  existing	  literature,	  
we	   found	   convergence	   towards	   full	   unraveling.	   However,	   even	   in	  markets	  with	  many	  
repeat	  purchases,	  we	  do	  not	  feel	  that	  full	  feedback	  is	  either	  (1)	  a	  realistic	  description	  of	  
the	  feedback	  consumers	  receive	  or	  (2)	  a	  realistic	  policy	  prescription	  for	  most	  settings	  of	  
voluntary	  and	  verifiable	  disclosure.	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3.4	  Additional	  Tasks	  
After	  completing	  45	  rounds,	  each	  subject	  faced	  one	  of	  seven	  additional	  tasks.	  In	  the	  
first	  additional	  task,	  which	  we	  call	  the	  “Distribution”	  task,	  subjects	  were	  asked	  to	  guess	  
the	  rate	  at	  which	  senders	   reported	  each	  secret	  number	   in	   the	   initial	  45	  rounds	  of	   the	  
experiment.	   The	   aim	   of	   this	   task	  was	   to	   assess	  whether	   subject	   beliefs	   about	   sender	  
strategies	  were	  correct.	  The	  guesses	  in	  this	  task	  were	  not	  incentivized,	  which	  introduces	  
the	  potential	  for	  extra	  noise	  in	  the	  responses.	  
The	   second	  additional	   task,	  which	  we	   call	   the	   “Self”	   task,	   is	   one	   in	  which	   subjects	  
played	  once	  more	  in	  the	  role	  of	  sender	  and	  in	  the	  role	  of	  receiver,	  but	  this	  time	  against	  
their	  own	   decisions	   from	  past	   rounds.	  When	   in	   the	   role	  of	   sender,	   subjects	  were	   told	  
that	   if	  they	  reported,	  their	  computer	  opponent	  would	  guess	  the	  secret	  number,	  and	  if	  
they	  did	  not	  report,	  their	  computer	  opponent	  would	  match	  the	  guess	  they	  had	  made	  in	  
a	   past	   round	   in	   which	   their	   opponent	   did	   not	   report.	   When	   in	   the	   role	   of	   receiver,	  
subjects	  were	  asked	   to	  guess	   the	  secret	  number	   from	  a	  previous	   round	   in	  which	   they	  
did	   not	   report	   the	   secret	   number.	   The	  payoffs	   from	   this	   task	  were	   added	   to	   the	   ECU	  
earned	  in	  the	  first	  45	  rounds.	  	  
It	   seems	   possible,	   but	   unlikely,	   that	   subjects	   could	   remember	   all	   of	   their	   past	  
decisions,	   so	   subjects	  would	   need	   to	   remember	   their	   own	   past	   strategy.	   This	   type	   of	  
task	  is	  designed	  to	  assess	  whether	  subjects	  can	  best	  respond	  to	  accurate	  beliefs,	  under	  
the	   assumption	   that	   they	   form	   accurate	   beliefs	   about	   their	   own	   strategies.	   A	   similar	  
approach	  was	  used	  by	  Ivanov,	  Levin,	  and	  Niederle	  (2010)	  in	  examining	  the	  role	  of	  beliefs	  
in	  the	  Winner’s	  Curse.	  
The	   third,	  which	  we	  call	   the	  “Holt-­‐Laury”	   task,	   subjects	  completed	   the	  well-­‐known	  
measure	  of	  risk	  aversion	  introduced	  by	  Holt	  and	  Laury	  (2002).	  For	  this	  measure,	  subjects	  
make	  10	  choices	  between	  a	  “safer”	   lottery	   (payments	  of	  $2.00	  or	  $1.60)	  and	  “riskier”	  
lottery	  (payments	  of	  $3.85	  or	  $0.10)	   in	  which	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  high	  payment	  was	  
the	   same	  within	  each	   choice,	   but	   varied	  across	   choices.	  A	   risk-­‐neutral	   decision	  maker	  
would	  choose	  the	  lottery	  with	  a	  40%	  chance	  of	  $2	  over	  the	  lottery	  with	  a	  40%	  chance	  of	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$3.85,	  but	  the	  lottery	  with	  a	  50%	  chance	  of	  $3.85	  over	  the	  lottery	  with	  a	  50%	  chance	  of	  
$2.	  The	  switching	  point	  in	  this	  “multiple	  price	  list”	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  
risk	  preferences	  of	  each	  subject.	  	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  task	  was	  to	  see	  whether	  sender	  and	  receiver	  choices	  were	  related	  to	  
the	  risk	  preferences	  of	  subjects.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  one	  choice	  was	  randomly	  
selected,	  and	  any	  earnings	  from	  the	  realization	  of	  that	  lottery	  were	  added	  to	  the	  show-­‐
up	  fee	  and	  earnings	  from	  the	  first	  45	  rounds.	  
We	  call	  the	  fourth	  additional	  task	  the	  “Past”	  task,	  because	  after	  45	  rounds	  subjects	  
played	   once	  more	   in	   the	   role	   of	   sender	   and	   in	   the	   role	   of	   receiver,	   this	   time	   against	  
opponents’	  decisions	  from	  past	  rounds.	  When	  in	  the	  role	  of	  sender,	  subjects	  were	  told	  
that	   if	  they	  reported,	  their	  computer	  opponent	  would	  guess	  the	  secret	  number,	  and	  if	  
they	  did	  not	   report,	   their	   computer	  opponent	  would	  match	   the	   guess	  of	   one	  of	   their	  
guesses	  of	  a	  receiver	  from	  a	  past	  round	  in	  which	  they	  did	  not	  report.	  When	  in	  the	  role	  of	  
receiver,	   subjects	   were	   asked	   to	   guess	   the	   secret	   number	   from	   a	   previous	   round	   in	  
which	  their	  opponent	  did	  not	  report	  the	  secret	  number.	  The	  payoffs	  from	  this	  task	  were	  
added	  to	  the	  ECU	  earned	  in	  the	  first	  45	  rounds.	  	  
This	  type	  of	  task	  is	  designed	  to	  keep	  the	  strategic	  decisions	  the	  same	  as	  in	  previous	  
choices,	  but	  to	  remove	  the	  playoff	  implications	  for	  others.	  By	  comparing	  these	  choices	  
with	   previous	   choices,	   we	   can	   determine	   whether	   sender	   and	   receiver	   choices	   were	  
impacted	   by	   any	   social	   preferences.	   Niederle	   and	   Vesterlund	   (2007)	   use	   a	   similar	  
approach	  to	  separate	  preferences	  for	  competition	  from	  social	  preferences.	  
In	  the	  fifth,	  which	  we	  call	  the	  “Computer”	  task,	  subjects	  played	  5	  additional	  rounds	  
in	   the	  role	  of	   receiver	  against	  a	  computer	  sender.	   In	   this	   task,	   subjects	  were	  told	   that	  
“the	   S	   player	   (computer)	   will	   report	   the	   secret	   number	   that	   would	   maximize	   their	  
earnings	  given	  the	  guesses	  of	  all	  other	  participants	  (besides	  yourself)	  in	  the	  proceeding	  
round.”	  In	  practice,	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  computer	  reported	  the	  secret	  number	  if	  it	  was	  
above	  the	  average	  guess	  for	  all	  other	  subjects	  in	  the	  previous	  round.	  The	  payoffs	  from	  
this	  task	  were	  added	  to	  the	  ECU	  earned	  in	  the	  first	  45	  rounds.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  task	  was	  
to	  assess	  whether	  any	  failures	  of	  unraveling	  in	  the	  first	  45	  rounds	  were	  due	  solely	  to	  the	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fact	  that	  receivers	  believe	  senders	  were	  potentially	  non-­‐optimizing	  or	  poorly	   informed	  
humans,	  which	  may	  be	  good	  assumption	  for	  small	  firms,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  large	  firms.	  
With	   the	   last	   two	   additional	   tasks,	   we	   tested	   two	   possible	   informational	  
interventions.	  Subjects	  were	  shown	  some	   information	  about	  the	  play	  of	  all	  subjects	   in	  
the	   first	   45	   rounds,	   then	   completed	   the	   same	   choices	   as	   in	   the	   “Past”	   task,	   and	   then	  
played	   5	  more	   rounds	   just	   as	   in	   the	   first	   45	   rounds.	   The	   payoffs	   from	   this	   task	  were	  
added	  to	  the	  ECU	  earned	  in	  the	  first	  45	  rounds.	  
In	   the	   sixth	   additional	   task,	   which	   we	   call	   the	   “Average	   Reports”	   task,	   the	  
information	  that	  subjects	  were	  shown	  was	  the	  average	  reported	  secret	  number	  from	  all	  
subjects	   in	   that	   session	   from	   the	   first	   45	   rounds.	   However,	   because	   the	   number	   of	  
rounds	  in	  which	  the	  secret	  number	  was	  report	  was	  not	  provided,	  there	  was	  not	  enough	  
information	   for	   subjects	   to	   infer	   anything	   about	   the	   average	   non-­‐reported	   secret	  
number.	  
We	   call	   the	   final	   additional	   task	   the	   “Consumer	   Reports”	   task	   because	   the	  
information	  that	  subjects	  were	  shown	  was	  in	  the	  style	  of	  the	  popular	  publication	  of	  the	  
same	  name.	   Subjects	  were	   shown	   the	  number	  of	   times	   that	   each	   secret	   number	  was	  
reported	   and	   not	   reported	   for	   all	   subjects	   from	   the	   first	   45	   rounds.	   This	   provided	  
enough	   information	   to	   determine	   both	   the	   average	   reported	   secret	   number	   and	   the	  
average	  non-­‐reported	  secret	  number.	  
	  
4	   Experimental	  Results	  
Our	   primary	   study	   was	   conducted	   in	   the	   Center	   for	   Experimental	   Social	   Science	  
(CESS)	  laboratory	  at	  New	  York	  University.	  In	  this	  laboratory,	  subjects	  are	  separated	  with	  
dividers,	   and	   each	   subject	   is	   provided	   with	   a	   personal	   computer	   terminal.	   Our	  
experiment	  was	  run	  using	  the	  z-­‐Tree	  software	  package	  (Fischbacher	  2007).	  
In	   this	  study,	  we	  observed	  212	  subjects	  complete	  a	   total	  of	  9,540	  rounds.	  Over	  16	  
sessions,	  the	  median	  and	  mode	  session	  size	  was	  14	  subjects.	  All	  subjects	  were	  students	  
at	  New	  York	  University.	  At	  CESS	  we	  used	  a	  show-­‐up	  fee	  of	  $5,	  and	  on	  average	  subjects	  
earned	  $25.40.	  The	  minimum	  payment	  was	  $18	  and	  the	  maximum	  payment	  was	  $30.85.	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As	  we	  show	  in	  section	  4.2,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  learning	  in	  the	  first	  5	  rounds.	  Because	  
feedback	  is	  limited,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  subjects	  are	  learning	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  game,	  
such	   as	   internalizing	   the	   payoffs	   in	   each	   role	   and	   confirming	   that	   senders	   cannot	  
misrepresent	   the	   state.	  Because	  we	  want	   to	   study	  how	  subjects	  play	  once	   they	  know	  
the	   structure	  of	   the	  game,	  we	  drop	   the	   first	  5	   rounds	  of	  each	   session	   in	   the	  analyses	  
that	  follow.	  However,	  our	  results	  are	  robust	  to	  including	  these	  5	  rounds.	  
	  
4.1	  Senders	  Partially	  Disclose	  
Looking	  first	  at	  sender	  behavior,	  we	  find	  that	  while	  disclosure	  is	  partial,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  
random.	  Figure	  1	  displays	  the	  average	  rate	  of	  reporting	  for	  each	  possible	  secret	  number.	  
A	   secret	   number	   of	   1	   is	   reported	   5.7%	  of	   the	   time,	   a	   secret	   number	   of	   3	   is	   reported	  
88.6%	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  secret	  numbers	  of	  4	  or	  5	  are	  reported	  over	  97.7%	  of	  the	  time.	  
Most	  of	   the	  action	  occurs	   for	  a	  secret	  number	  of	  2,	  which	   is	   reported	   in	  40.8%	  of	   the	  
time	  it	  is	  realized.	  6	  	  
At	   these	   reporting	   rates,	   if	   each	   secret	   number	   was	   realized	   with	   exactly	   equal	  
probability,	  the	  average	  non-­‐reported	  secret	  number	  would	  be	  1.569.	  The	  true	  average	  
non-­‐reported	  secret	  number	  is	  1.584,	  with	  a	  standard	  deviation	  of	  0.770.	  Looking	  across	  
sessions,	  the	  standard	  deviation	  in	  the	  average	  non-­‐reported	  secret	  number	  is	  0.150.	  
Most	   of	   the	   aggregate	   variation	   in	   reporting	   a	   secret	   number	   of	   2	   is	   due	   to	  
heterogeneity	   between	   individuals,	   not	   variability	   within	   each	   individual.	   42.9%	   of	  
subjects	  never	  report	  a	  secret	  number	  of	  2,	  and	  25%	  of	  subjects	  always	  report	  a	  secret	  
number	  of	  2.	  The	  average	  standard	  deviation	  in	  the	  reporting	  rate	  within	  each	  individual	  
is	  0.168,	  but	  the	  median	  is	  0.	  Given	  the	  stability	  in	  individual	  sender	  behavior	  over	  the	  
course	  of	   the	  experiment,	   it	   follows	   that	  aggregate	  sender	  behavior	   is	   stable	  over	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Looking	   at	   the	   individual	   level,	   just	   2.4%	   of	   subjects	   always	   reported	   the	   secret	  
number.	   This	   is	   far	   lower	   than	   some	   estimates	   in	   the	   experimental	   literature	   for	   the	  
fraction	  of	  “honest”	  types.	  Such	  a	  discrepancy	  could	  be	  due	  to	  how	  reporting	  is	  framed	  
in	  our	  experiment	  or	   in	  differences	  between	  how	  subjects	  view	  “lies	  of	  omission”	  and	  
active	  lying.	  Exploring	  these	  issues	  is	  a	  potentially	  interesting	  avenue	  for	  future	  work.	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course	   of	   the	   experiment.	   This	   may	   not	   be	   surprising	   given	   the	   lack	   of	   feedback	  
between	  rounds.	  
As	   mentioned	   previously,	   failing	   to	   report	   a	   secret	   number	   of	   2,	   3,	   4,	   or	   5	   goes	  
against	   the	   predictions	   of	   the	   unique	   sequential	   equilibrium.	   Looking	   just	   at	   rounds	  
where	   the	   realized	   secret	   number	   was	   one	   of	   these	   four	   numbers,	   the	   average	  
percentage	   of	   non-­‐equilibrium	   choices	   for	   each	   subject	  when	   in	   the	   role	   of	   sender	   is	  
19.6%,	  with	   a	   standard	  deviation	  of	   17.4%.	   The	  median	  percentage	   is	   16.7%,	   the	  25th	  
and	   75th	   percentiles	   are	   5.0%	   and	   31.3%	   respectively,	   which	   shows	   that	   while	   some	  
subjects	   made	   many	   more	   non-­‐equilibrium	   choices,	   most	   subjects	   made	   some	   non-­‐
equilibrium	  choices	  when	  in	  the	  role	  of	  sender.	  
However,	  given	  that	  the	  average	  guess	  for	  a	  non-­‐reported	  secret	  number	  is	  2.022,	  it	  
is	  a	  (risk	  neutral)	  sender’s	  best	  response	  not	  report	  a	  secret	  number	  of	  1	  and	  to	  report	  
all	   secret	   numbers	   above	   2.	   Given	   that	   the	   95%	   confidence	   interval	   for	   the	   average	  
guess	   for	   a	   non-­‐reported	   secret	   number	   is	   1.978	   to	   2.066,	   we	   will	   consider	   both	  
reporting	  and	  not	  reporting	  a	  best	  response	  when	  the	  secret	  number	  is	  2.	  
If	  we	  look	  just	  at	  secret	  numbers	  of	  1,	  3,	  4,	  and	  5,	  the	  average	  percentage	  of	  choices	  
that	  are	  not	  a	  best	  response	  for	  each	  subject	  when	  in	  the	  role	  of	  sender	  is	  5.3%,	  with	  a	  
standard	  deviation	  of	  11.1%.	  The	  median	  percentage	  is	  0%,	  the	  25th	  and	  75th	  percentiles	  
are	  0%	  and	  6.1%	  respectively,	  which	  shows	  that	  most	  subjects	  best	  respond	  when	  in	  the	  
role	   of	   sender.	   This	   stands	   in	   strong	   contrast	   to	   the	   widespread	   departures	   from	  
equilibrium.	  
	  
4.2	  Receivers	  Guess	  Too	  High	  
Turning	  to	  receiver	  behavior,	  we	  find	  systematic	  deviations	  from	  the	  predictions	  of	  
equilibrium	  when	  the	  secret	  number	  is	  not	  reported.7	  However,	  unlike	  sender	  behavior,	  
receiver	  choices	  are	  often	  not	  a	  best	  response.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Subjects	   had	   no	   problem	   guessing	   correctly	   when	   the	   secret	   number	   was	   actually	  
reported	  by	  senders,	  as	  92.2%	  of	  guesses	  were	  identical	  to	  the	  reported	  number.	  57.3%	  
of	   the	   remaining	  guesses	  were	   just	   .5	  higher,	  which	  appear	   to	  be	   small	   “rewards”	   for	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Figure	  3	  shows	  the	  aggregate	  distribution	  of	  guesses	  when	  the	  secret	  number	  was	  
not	  reported.	  The	  largest	  mass	  point	  is	  for	  a	  guess	  of	  1.5,	  which	  is	  guessed	  in	  25.4%	  of	  
the	  time.	  However,	  1	  is	  guessed	  19.7%	  of	  the	  time,	  2	  is	  guessed	  21.5%	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  3	  
is	  guessed	  18.1%	  of	  the	  time.	  
As	  mentioned	  previously,	  the	  average	  guess	  across	  rounds	  is	  2.022,	  and	  this	  number	  
is	  fairly	  stable	  across	  the	  course	  of	  the	  experiment.	  Figure	  5	  shows	  the	  average	  guess	  for	  
each	  block	  of	  5	  rounds	  (after	  the	  first	  5).	  The	  horizontal	  line	  is	  the	  average	  guess	  across	  
rounds	   (after	   the	   first	   5).	   There	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   slight	   decrease	   in	   the	   average	   guess	  
across	   rounds,	   which	   is	   confirmed	   by	   regressing	   the	   guess	   on	   the	   round	   number	  
(controlling	   for	   subject	   fixed	   effects	   and	   using	   robust	   standard	   errors).8	  However,	   the	  
effect	  size	  is	  very	  small	  (-­‐0.002)	  and	  not	  significant	  at	  a	  10%	  level	  (p=0.132).	  9	  
As	  mentioned	  previously,	  the	  prediction	  of	  equilibrium	  is	  that	  receivers	  will	  always	  
guess	  the	  secret	  number	  is	  1	  when	  it	  is	  not	  reported.	  However,	  81.3%	  of	  choices	  do	  not	  
correspond	  to	  equilibrium.	  At	  the	  individual	   level,	  91.5%	  of	  subjects	  make	  at	   least	  one	  
non-­‐equilibrium	  choice,	  and	  60.4%	  of	  subjects	  never	  make	  the	  equilibrium	  choice.	  
The	  average	  non-­‐reported	  secret	  number	  is	  1.584,	  with	  a	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  of	  
1.544	  to	  1.624.	  Given	  that	  the	  average	  non-­‐reported	  secret	  number	  is	  closest	  to	  1.5,	  the	  
best	  response	  for	  (risk	  neutral)	  receivers	  is	  to	  guess	  1.5,	  which	  is	  above	  the	  equilibrium	  
prediction	  of	  1.	  While	  25.4%	  of	  guesses	  correspond	  to	  this	  best	  response,	  only	  8.5%	  of	  
subjects	  always	  best	  respond,	  and	  55.2%	  never	  best	  respond.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reporting,	   and	   10%	   were	   guesses	   under	   5	   for	   reports	   of	   5,	   which	   appear	   to	   be	   a	  
“punishments”	  for	  getting	  a	  high	  secret	  number.	  8	  If	  we	  regress	  guess	  onto	  both	  the	  number	  of	  rounds	  as	  sender	  and	  the	  number	  of	  
rounds	  a	  receiver	  (controlling	  for	  subject	  fixed	  effects	  and	  using	  robust	  standard	  errors),	  
the	  coefficient	  on	  rounds	  as	  sender	  is	  more	  negative	  (-­‐0.010	  to	  -­‐0.056)	  and	  has	  a	  smaller	  
p-­‐value	  (0.076	  to	  0.289).	  However,	  both	  effect	  sizes	  are	  small	  and	  neither	  is	  significant	  
at	  a	  5%	  level.	  
9	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  is	  stronger	  evidence	  that	  guesses	  drop	  over	  the	  first	  5	  
rounds.	  Restricted	  to	  the	  first	  5	  rounds,	  if	  we	  regress	  guess	  onto	  period	  (with	  subject	  
fixed	  effects	  and	  robust	  standard	  errors),	  the	  coefficient	  for	  period	  is	  significant	  at	  a	  5%	  
level	  (p=0.045).	  However,	  this	  coefficient	  is	  still	  relatively	  small	  (-­‐0.052).	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However,	  because	  of	   the	  shape	  of	   the	   receiver’s	  payoff	   function,	   the	   lost	  earnings	  
from	   not	   best	   responding	   differ	   substantially	   by	   the	   guess	   made.	   Given	   the	   actual	  
reporting	   rates	   for	   each	   secret	   number,	   if	   each	   secret	   number	   occurred	  with	   exactly	  
equal	  probability,	   the	  returns	  to	  guessing	  1.5	  when	  the	  secret	  number	   is	  not	  reported	  
are	  98.5	  ECU.	  The	  lost	  earnings	  associated	  with	  a	  guess	  of	  1	  would	  be	  1.8,	  with	  a	  guess	  
of	  2	  would	  be	  2.75,	  with	  a	  guess	  of	  3	  would	  be	  25.8,	  with	  a	  guess	  of	  4	  would	  be	  60.6,	  
and	  with	  a	  guess	  of	  5	  would	  be	  102.7.	  
	  
4.3	  Replication	  Study	  
We	  conducted	  a	   replication	   study	  at	   the	  Computer	   Lab	   for	  Experimental	  Research	  
(CLER)	  facility	  at	  the	  Harvard	  Business	  School.	  Once	  again	  the	  experiment	  was	  run	  using	  
the	  z-­‐Tree	  software	  package	  (Fischbacher	  2007).	  At	  CLER	  we	  also	  used	  a	  show	  up	  fee	  of	  
$5	  and	  kept	  the	  same	  conversion	  rate	  of	  ECU	  to	  dollars.	  
In	   this	   study,	  we	   observed	   120	   subjects	   complete	   a	   total	   of	   5,400	   rounds.	  Over	   9	  
sessions,	  the	  median	  and	  mode	  session	  size	  was	  14	  subjects	  (as	  before).	  Here	  also,	  we	  
drop	  the	  first	  5	  rounds	  of	  each	  session.	  This	  still	  leaves	  40	  rounds	  per	  subject,	  for	  a	  total	  
of	  4,800	  rounds.	  	  
Unlike	  the	  subject	  pool	  at	  CESS,	  the	  subject	  pool	  at	  CLER	  includes	  both	  students	  and	  
non-­‐students.	  The	  only	  requirement	  for	  participation	  was	  not	  to	  be	  a	  Harvard	  University	  
employee.	   Of	   the	   120	   subjects	   who	   completed	   our	   experiment,	   just	   55%	   were	  
undergraduates	  in	  their	  first	  four	  years	  of	  studies.	  
Figure	  2	  displays	   the	  average	   rate	  of	   reporting	   for	  each	  possible	   secret	  number	   in	  
our	   replication	   study.	   In	   comparison	   to	   Figure	   1,	   the	   rate	   of	   reporting	   for	   secret	  
numbers	  of	  1	  appears	  slightly	  higher	  in	  the	  replication	  study,	  and	  the	  rate	  of	  report	  for	  
secret	  numbers	  of	  5	  appears	  slightly	  lower.	  However,	  a	  Pearson's	  chi-­‐square	  test	  cannot	  
reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  true	  reporting	  rates	  are	  the	  same	  in	  both	  populations	  
(p=0.342).	  
Figure	  4	  shows	  the	  aggregate	  distribution	  of	  guesses	  when	  the	  secret	  number	  was	  
not	  reported	  in	  our	  replication	  study.	  In	  comparison	  to	  Figure	  3,	  the	  fraction	  of	  rounds	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where	   subjects	   guess	   1.5	   appears	   smaller	   and	   the	   fraction	   of	   rounds	   where	   subjects	  
guess	  5	  appears	  slightly	  larger.	  However,	  once	  again	  the	  results	  of	  the	  replication	  study	  
are	   not	   significantly	   different	   from	   the	   results	   of	   the	   primary	   study.	   A	   Kolmogorov-­‐
Smirnov	  test	  cannot	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  true	  distributions	  of	  guesses	  are	  
the	  same	  in	  both	  populations	  (p=0.361).	  
	  
4.4	  Exploring	  Receiver	  Over-­‐Guessing	  
Not	  only	  do	   receivers	   fail	   to	  best	   respond,	   they	  more	  often	  guess	  higher	   than	   the	  
best	   response	   –	   sometimes	   far	   higher.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   this	   “over-­‐guessing”,	   when	   the	  
secret	   number	   is	   2,	   senders	   do	  not	   have	   an	   incentive	   to	   separate	   through	  disclosure.	  
This	  exposes	  a	  fundamental	  breakdown	  in	  the	  mechanics	  of	  unraveling.	  
Thus,	   we	   spend	   most	   of	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	   paper	   exploring	   the	   nature	   and	  
potential	   causes	   of	   receiver	   over-­‐guessing.	   Our	   leading	   explanation	   is	   that	   receivers	  
have	   incorrect	   beliefs	   that	   stem	   from	   bad	   inferences	   about	   non-­‐disclosure.	   We	   also	  
consider	  and	  reject	  several	  alternative	  explanations:	  stochastic	  errors,	  choice	  heuristics,	  
risk	  aversion,	  and	  social	  preferences.	  
	  
4.4.1	  Bad	  Inferences	  about	  Non-­‐Reports	  
Our	   most	   convincing	   evidence	   that	   bad	   inferences	   about	   non-­‐reports	   drive	   over-­‐
guessing	   is	   that	   receiver	   guesses	   about	   non-­‐disclosed	   secret	   numbers	   improve	  
substantially	  after	  being	  provided	  additional	  information	  about	  reporting.	  This	  evidence	  
is	   discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   when	   we	   report	   the	   results	   of	   our	   “Consumer	   Reports”	  
intervention.	  
For	  policymakers,	  it	  may	  be	  sufficient	  to	  know	  that	  bad	  inferences	  by	  consumers	  can	  
produce	  incomplete	  disclosure.	  However,	  to	  design	  effective	  information	  interventions,	  
it	  may	  be	  helpful	  to	  know	  the	  source	  of	  these	  mistakes.	  
One	  possible	  reason	  for	  bad	   inferences	  about	  non-­‐disclosure	   is	  that	  receivers	  have	  
incorrect	  beliefs	  about	  the	  reporting	  strategies	  of	  senders.	  Another	  possible	  explanation	  
is	  that	  receivers	  have	  trouble	  conditioning	  on	  actions,	  so	  even	  though	  they	  have	  correct	  
	   21	  
beliefs	  about	   the	  reporting	  strategies	  of	  senders,	   they	   fail	   to	  correctly	  account	   for	   the	  
informational	  content	  of	  actions.	  
We	  use	  our	  first	  additional	  task	  (the	  “Distribution”	  task)	  to	  help	  separate	  these	  two	  
possible	   explanations,	   and	   we	   find	   evidence	   in	   support	   of	   conditioning	   failures.	   Our	  
second	  additional	  task	  (the	  “Self”	  task)	  provides	  additional	  supporting	  evidence	  for	  this	  
conclusion.	   We	   then	   show	   how	   a	   leading	   theory	   of	   conditioning	   failures,	   Cursed	  
Equilibrium	   (Eyster	  and	  Rabin	  2005),	   can	  explain	   the	  behavior	  of	  most	   subjects	   in	  our	  
experiment.	  
All	  120	  subjects	  in	  the	  replication	  study	  completed	  the	  “Distribution”	  task,	  in	  which	  
subjects	  guess	  the	  reporting	  rate	  for	  each	  secret	  number	  after	  the	  initial	  45	  rounds	  were	  
complete.	   By	   looking	   directly	   at	   these	   responses,	   we	   can	   get	   a	   sense	   for	   whether	  
subjects	   have	   incorrect	   beliefs	   about	   sender	   strategies,	   which	   is	   the	   foundation	   of	  
behavioral	  approaches	  such	  as	  “Level-­‐k”	  theory.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  receiver	  believes	  that	  
20%	  of	  senders	  with	  secret	  number	  1	  will	  report,	  but	  actually	  only	  5%	  of	  such	  senders	  
report,	  this	  receiver	  does	  not	  have	  correct	  beliefs	  about	  sender	  strategies.	  	  
Also,	  if	  subjects	  correctly	  use	  Bayes’	  rule,	  then	  combining	  their	  beliefs	  about	  sender	  
strategies	   with	   the	   probability	   of	   each	   secret	   number	   implies	   a	   belief	   about	   non-­‐
reported	  secret	  numbers.	  By	  looking	  at	  the	  differences	  between	  these	  “implied	  beliefs”	  
and	  what	  subjects	  actually	  guessed	  when	  secret	  numbers	  were	  not	  reported,	  we	  can	  get	  
a	  sense	  for	  whether	  subjects	  are	  failing	  to	  correctly	  condition	  on	  actions.	  For	  example,	  if	  
a	  receiver	  believes	  that	  the	  sender	  reporting	  rate	  is	  20%	  for	  a	  secret	  number	  of	  1,	  40%	  
for	   2,	   80%	   for	   3,	   and	   100%	   for	   4	   and	   5,	   then	   she	   should	   guess	   the	   secret	   number	  
conditional	   on	   non-­‐reporting	   as	   1.625	   because	   [(100%-­‐20%)*1+(100%-­‐40%)*2+(100%-­‐
80%)*3]/[(100%-­‐20%)+(100%-­‐40%)+(100%-­‐80%)]=1.625.	   If	   when	   faced	   non-­‐disclosure	  
her	  actual	  guess	  is	  far	  from	  1.625,	  then	  she	  has	  a	  problem	  translating	  her	  beliefs	  about	  
sender	  strategies	  into	  a	  guess	  conditional	  on	  non-­‐reporting.	  
Figure	   6	   shows	   the	   frequency	   of	   guesses	   for	   the	   reporting	   rates,	   where	   a	   larger	  
bubble	  represents	  more	  subjects	  guessing	  closer	  to	  that	  point.	  Looking	  across	  subjects,	  
the	  median	  guess	  of	  the	  reporting	  rate	  is	  3.5%	  for	  a	  secret	  number	  of	  1,	  20%	  for	  2,	  50%	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for	   3,	   95%	   for	   4,	   and	  100%	   for	   5	   (actual	   rates	  were	  10.7%,	  42.6%,	  77.9%,	  92.6%,	   and	  
92.8%	  respectively).	  At	  the	   individual	   level,	   the	  median	  difference	  between	  a	  subject’s	  
guess	   of	   a	   reporting	   rate	   and	   the	   actual	   reporting	   rate	   is	   10.7	   percentage	   points.	   So	  
while	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  incorrect	  beliefs	  about	  sender	  strategies,	  it	  appears	  that	  most	  
subjects	  understand	  the	  broad	  features	  of	  actual	  reporting	  rates.	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   we	   see	   clear	   evidence	   of	   conditioning	   failures.	   As	   shown	   in	  
Figure	  7,	  the	  distribution	  of	  mode	  guesses	  from	  the	  first	  45	  rounds	  is	  shifted	  to	  the	  right	  
of	  the	   implied	  beliefs	  about	  the	  average	  non-­‐disclosed	  number.	   In	  fact,	   implied	  beliefs	  
are	   on	   average	   0.352	   lower	   than	   mode	   guesses	   from	   the	   first	   45	   rounds,	   which	   is	  
statistically	  significant	  (one-­‐sided	  t-­‐test,	  p<0.001).	  
In	   the	   “Self”	   task,	   which	   was	   completed	   by	   38	   subjects	   from	   the	   primary	   study,	  
receivers	  switch	  from	  playing	  a	  human	  sender	  during	  the	  first	  45	  rounds	  to	  guessing	  the	  
state	   from	   their	   own	   past	   non-­‐reports.	   Subjects	   should	   know	   their	   own	   reporting	  
strategies,	  so	  unless	  they	  have	  problems	  conditioning	  on	  actions,	  then	  subjects	  should	  
be	  able	  to	  reliably	  guess	  the	  average	  secret	  number	  when	  they	  did	  not	  report.	  However,	  
we	  find	  that	  receivers	  guess	  higher	  than	  their	  average	  past	  non-­‐reported	  secret	  number	  
by	   0.341	   on	   average,	   and	   this	   increase	   is	   statistically	   significant	   (one-­‐sided	   t-­‐test,	  
p=0.002).	  	  
The	  concept	  of	  conditioning	  failures	  was	  formalized	  in	  a	  behavioral	  approach	  called	  
“Cursed	   Equilibrium”,	  which	  was	   introduced	   by	   Eyster	   and	   Rabin	   (2005).	   In	   fact,	   they	  
feature	  the	  disclosure	  game	  as	  a	  potential	  application	  of	  their	  approach.	  Under	  Cursed	  
Equilibrium,	   receiver	   beliefs	   about	   the	   average	   non-­‐disclosed	   state	   are	   a	   weighted	  
average	  of	  (1)	  correct	  beliefs	  about	  the	  average	  non-­‐disclosed	  state	  and	  (2)	  beliefs	  that	  
the	   sender	   could	   be	   any	   type	   (with	   equal	   probability).	   Sender	   beliefs	   are	   correct	  
because	  they	  have	  no	  actions	  to	  condition	  on.	  	  
The	  weights	  used	  by	  receivers	  to	  form	  beliefs	  are	  a	  free	  parameter	  of	  the	  model.	  A	  
receiver	   with	   a	   weight	   of	   zero	   has	   perfectly	   correct	   beliefs	   about	   the	   average	   non-­‐
disclosed	  state,	  so	  will	  guess	  1.5.	  A	  receiver	  with	  a	  weight	  of	  one	  thinks	  that	  the	  sender	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could	  be	  of	  any	   type,	   so	  will	  guess	  3.	  Thus,	  by	  varying	   this	  weight,	  Cursed	  Equilibrium	  
can	  explain	  any	  receiver	  choices	  from	  1.5	  to	  3.	  
A	  substantial	  majority	  of	  subjects	  in	  our	  experiment	  best	  respond	  to	  the	  distribution	  
of	  receiver	  actions	  when	  they	  are	  in	  the	  role	  of	  sender	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  Cursed	  
Equilibrium.	  On	  the	  receiver	  side,	  the	  mode	  guesses	  of	  77.4%	  of	  receivers	  in	  our	  primary	  
study	   and	   68.3%	   of	   receivers	   in	   our	   replication	   study	   are	   between	   1.5	   and	   3,	   so	   the	  
behavior	  of	  these	  subjects	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  Cursed	  Equilibrium.	  
The	   largest	   percentage	  of	   subjects	   that	   this	   theory	   fails	   to	   explain	   is	   the	  17.5%	  of	  
subjects	  that	  make	  a	  mode	  guess	  of	  1	  (the	  same	  percentage	  for	  both	  studies).	  However,	  
in	   the	  “Past”	   task	   (which	  will	  be	  discussed	   later),	  we	  see	  evidence	   that	   some	  subjects	  
may	  have	  believed	  the	  best	  guess	  was	  3,	  but	  because	  of	  punishment	  motives,	  actually	  
guessed	  1.	  
	  
4.4.2	  Alternative	  Explanations:	  Choice	  Errors	  and	  Heuristics	  
One	  potential	  explanation	  for	  why	  we	  see	  overly	  high	  guesses	  is	  that	  receivers	  make	  
choice	   errors	   with	   some	   probability.	   This	   is	   the	   reasoning	   behind	   some	   stochastic	  
models	  of	  choice,	  such	  as	  Logit	  demand	  and	  Quantal	  Response	  Equilibrium.	  
However,	   a	   multiple	   factor	   Analysis	   of	   Variance	   (ANOVA)	   for	   period	   and	   subject	  
shows	  that	  just	  1.5%	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  guesses	  is	  due	  to	  differences	  in	  subject	  choices	  
over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   experience,	   while	   74.3%	   of	   the	   variation	   in	   guesses	   is	   due	   to	  
differences	  in	  choices	  between	  subjects.	  Thus,	  it	  appears	  that	  overly	  high	  guess	  are	  not	  
the	  result	  of	  random	  over-­‐guessing,	  but	  systematic	  over-­‐guessing	  by	  some	  subjects.	  
	   Another	   potential	   explanation	   for	   high	   guesses	   is	   that	   receivers	   choose	   the	  
middle	  of	   the	  state	  space	  as	  choice	  heuristic.	  However,	  not	  all	  over-­‐guessing	   is	  due	  to	  
guesses	  of	  three,	  and	  in	  the	  “Summary	  Reports”	  task,	  we	  see	  that	  guesses	  of	  three	  can	  
be	   changed	   with	   additional	   information.	   In	   addition,	   we	   might	   expect	   the	   response	  
times	   to	   be	   shorter	  when	   subjects	   use	   heuristics	   (as	   suggested	  by	   the	   “Dual-­‐Process”	  
literature),	  but	  the	  response	  times	  for	  choices	  of	  3	  in	  our	  primary	  and	  replication	  studies	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were	   not	   statistically	   different	   from	   the	   average	   response	   time	   across	   guesses,	  which	  
was	  11.0	  seconds	  (two-­‐sided	  t-­‐test,	  p=0.292).	  
	  
4.4.3	  Alternative	  Explanation:	  Risk	  Aversion	  
One	  possible	  reason	  for	  variation	  in	  receiver	  choices	  is	  variation	  in	  risk	  preferences	  
among	  subjects.	  Because	   the	  payoff	   function	   that	   subjects	   face	   is	   concave,	  higher	   risk	  
aversion	   could	   lead	   receivers	   to	   guess	   closer	   to	   the	   middle	   of	   type	   space	   (a	   secret	  
number	   of	   3)	   than	   they	   would	   otherwise.	   Thus,	   such	   behavior	   could	   explain	   guesses	  
above	  equilibrium	  or	  the	  best	  response.	  
To	   get	   a	   handle	   on	   the	   role	   that	   risk	   aversion	   plays	   in	   receiver	   choices,	  we	   use	   a	  
standard	   measurement	   tool	   from	   experimental	   economics	   for	   assessing	   risk	  
preferences.	  As	  described	   in	   the	  previous	   section,	  38	   subjects	   from	  our	  primary	   study	  
completed	   the	  “Holt-­‐Laury”	   task	  after	   the	   initial	  45	   rounds.	  When	  a	   subject	  has	  more	  
than	  one	  switch	  point	  in	  the	  Holt-­‐Laury	  multiple	  price	  list,	  then	  risk	  preference	  are	  hard	  
to	  ascertain,	  but	  just	  3	  subjects	  had	  multiple	  switch	  points.	  
For	   the	  35	   subjects	   that	  had	  consistent	   switch	  points,	  5	  had	  a	   switch	  point	   that	   is	  
consistent	   with	   risk	   neutrality.	   Another	   3	   subjects	   had	   switch	   points	   consistent	   with	  
being	  risk	  loving,	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  subjects	  were	  consistent	  with	  being	  risk	  averse.	  There	  
was	  a	  fair	  bit	  of	  variation	  in	  switch	  points:	  5	  subjects	  switched	  from	  the	  safe	  lottery	  to	  
the	  risky	  lottery	  when	  there	  was	  a	  50%	  chance	  of	  the	  high	  payment,	  8	  switched	  when	  a	  
60%	  chance,	  7	  when	  a	  70%	  chance,	  and	  5	  when	  an	  80%	  chance.	  
	   We	  used	  an	  OLS	   regression	  of	   guess	  onto	   switch	  point	   to	   look	   for	  evidence	  of	  
positive	  relationship	  between	  risk	  aversion	  and	  the	  size	  of	  guesses.	  Controlling	  for	  the	  
number	  of	  rounds	  that	  a	  receiver	  had	  spent	  as	  a	  sender	  or	  receiver	  up	  to	  that	  point	  and	  
subject	   fixed	   effects,	   the	   coefficient	   on	   switch	   point	   is	   indeed	   positive,	   but	   is	   small	  
(0.012)	  and	  not	  significant	  (p=0.648).	  
	  
4.4.4	  Alternative	  Explanation:	  Social	  Preferences	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Another	   potential	   reason	   for	   why	   we	   observe	   guesses	   above	   the	   equilibrium	  
prediction	  is	  that	  receivers	  may	  guess	  higher	  than	  they	  would	  otherwise	  to	  reduce	  the	  
imbalance	   in	   payoffs	   between	   senders	   and	   receivers.	   Because	  of	   the	   concavity	   of	   the	  
payoff	  function,	  when	  receivers	  make	  very	  low	  guesses,	  sender	  payoffs	  are	  very	  low.	  In	  
many	  standard	  social	  preference	  models,	  agents	  lose	  utility	  when	  they	  experience	  guilt	  
over	  making	  much	  higher	  payoffs	  than	  their	  opponent.	  Such	  models	  would	  predict	  that	  
receivers	  would	  make	  higher	  guesses,	  even	  when	  the	  secret	  number	  is	  not	  reported.	  
For	  evidence	  of	  this,	  we	  examine	  26	  subjects	  from	  the	  primary	  study	  who	  completed	  
the	  “Past”	  additional	  task.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	   these	  subjects	  guessed	  the	  secret	  
number	  from	  an	  earlier	  round,	  but	  without	  playoff	  implications	  for	  the	  sender.	  If	  social	  
preferences	  were	  a	  leading	  explanation	  for	  higher	  guess,	  we	  would	  expect	  a	  decrease	  in	  
guesses	   in	   this	   task.	   Instead,	   the	   average	   guess	   increased	   by	   0.269,	   which	   is	   a	  
statistically	  significant	  increase	  at	  a	  10%	  level	  (one-­‐sided	  t-­‐test,	  p=0.062).	  In	  fact,	  4	  of	  26	  
subjects	   switched	   from	  a	   guess	   of	   1	   to	   a	   guess	   3.	   Taken	   together,	   this	   appears	   to	   be	  
evidence	  for	  a	  punishment	  motive	  towards	  those	  who	  do	  not	  disclose.	  Instead	  of	  force	  
pushing	   away	   from	   equilibrium,	   the	   social	   element	   in	   choice	   (which	   could	   be	   due	   to	  
social	  preferences)	  appears	  to	  be	  pushing	  behavior	  towards	  equilibrium.	  	  
	  
4.5	  Robustness:	  Computerized	  Senders	  
One	  potential	  objection	  to	  our	  results	  is	  that	  the	  behavior	  of	  firms	  may	  not	  be	  well	  
represented	  by	  a	  single	  human	  sender.	  However,	  this	  objection	  is	  mitigated	  by	  the	  fact	  
that	  senders	  best	  respond	  to	  receiver	  behavior	  in	  our	  experiment,	  so	  how	  much	  better	  
could	  a	  firm	  do?	  
It	   is	   possible	   that	   receivers	  may	   view	   firms	   and	   single	   human	   senders	   in	   different	  
ways.	  We	  would	  argue	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  “Mom	  and	  Pop”	  restaurant,	  the	  disclosure	  
behavior	  of	  the	  firm	  is	  often	  the	  response	  of	  a	  single	  human	  sender.	  However,	  it	  might	  
be	  that	  consumers	  view	  a	  large	  chain	  restaurant	  as	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  agent.	  
	  To	  provide	  some	  robustness	  along	  this	  dimension,	  we	  use	  computerized	  senders	  to	  
approximate	   perceptions	   about	   large	   firms.	   In	   our	   “Computer”	   task,	   receivers	   switch	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from	   playing	   a	   human	   sender	   to	   playing	   a	   computer	   sender,	   and	   as	   described	  
previously,	  the	  computer	  plays	  optimally	  given	  the	  choices	  of	  all	  other	  receivers	   in	  the	  
past	  round.	  This	  should	  reveal	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  choices	  are	  shaped	  by	  playing	  human	  
senders.10	  	  
For	   the	   34	   subjects	   in	   our	   primary	   study	   that	   completed	   this	   task,	   we	   find	   that	  
receiver	   guesses	   decrease	   slightly,	   but	   not	   enough	   to	   make	   full	   disclosure	   a	   best	  
response	   for	   all	   computer	   senders.	   The	   average	   difference	   between	   the	  mode	   guess	  
when	   playing	   against	   human	   senders	   and	   the	   mode	   guess	   when	   playing	   again	   the	  
computer	  sender	  drops	  by	   just	  0.103,	  which	   is	  not	  statistically	  significant	   (one-­‐sided	  t-­‐
test,	  p=0.128).	  
Because	   computer	   senders	   considered	   the	   behavior	   of	   other	   receivers	   in	   the	   past	  
round	  when	  deciding	  whether	   to	   report	   to	   a	   receiver,	   the	   likelihood	  of	   reporting	  was	  
not	   the	   same	   for	   all	   computer	   senders.	   When	   the	   secret	   numbers	   was	   2,	   computer	  
senders	   disclosed	   the	   number	   around	   56.8%	   of	   the	   time,	   close	   to	   the	   rate	   of	   human	  
senders.	  	  
	  
4.6	  Informational	  Interventions	  
One	   way	   to	   correct	   for	   incorrect	   beliefs	   about	   non-­‐disclosed	   types	   is	   to	   provide	  
additional	   information	   to	   receivers	   and/or	   senders.	   We	   implement	   three	   different	  
information	   interventions	   in	   the	   laboratory.	   The	   first	   to	   provide	   feedback	   after	   each	  
round,	  which	  is	  the	  approach	  taken	  in	  the	  existing	  literature.	  The	  second	  and	  third	  are	  
forms	   of	   aggregate	   information,	   which	   are	   described	   previously	   as	   the	   “Average	  
Reports”	  task	  and	  “Consumer	  Reports”	  task.	  
To	   examine	   the	   impact	   of	   feedback	   after	   each	   round,	   we	   ran	   an	   additional	  
experiment	   that	  was	   identical	   to	   the	   one	   described	   previously,	   but	  with	   one	   change:	  
after	   each	   round,	   senders	   and	   receivers	   were	   told	   the	   actual	   secret	   number	   in	   that	  
round	   for	   their	   pairing,	   the	   receiver’s	   guess,	   and	   the	   payoff	   implications	   of	   these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  This	  task	  also	  changes	  the	  social	  considerations,	  but	  we	  have	  found	  these	  to	  be	  
negligible	  in	  our	  experiment	  using	  the	  “Past”	  task.	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choices.	   This	   additional	   experiment	  was	   also	   run	   in	   the	   CESS	   laboratory	   at	   New	   York	  
University,	  and	  34	  subjects	  completed	  the	  experiment.	  
Over	  the	  last	  10	  rounds	  of	  this	  experiment,	  when	  the	  secret	  number	  was	  3,	  4,	  or	  5,	  
the	  secret	  number	  is	  reported	  100%	  of	  the	  time.	  Also,	  in	  contrast	  to	  our	  results	  without	  
such	  feedback,	  a	  secret	  number	  of	  2	  is	  reported	  85.2%	  of	  the	  time.	  A	  secret	  number	  of	  1	  
is	   still	   unlikely	   to	  be	   reported,	   as	   it	   is	   reported	  28%	  of	   the	   time,	  but	   this	  does	  not	   go	  
against	  the	  equilibrium	  predictions.	  
In	   the	   last	   10	   rounds,	   receiver	   guesses	   were	   also	   close	   to	   the	   equilibrium	  
predictions.	  In	  rounds	  where	  the	  secret	  number	  is	  not	  reported,	  81.8%	  of	  guesses	  are	  1,	  
with	  an	  average	  guess	  of	  just	  1.227.	  
In	   the	   “Average	   Reports”	   and	   “Consumer	   Reports”	   tasks,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   observe	  
both	   the	   direct	   impact	   of	   the	   additional	   information	   and	   the	   strategic	   impact	   of	   the	  
additional	   information.	   After	   45	   rounds,	   the	   subjects	   are	   shown	   the	   corresponding	  
aggregate	  information,	  and	  then	  guess	  the	  non-­‐reported	  secret	  number	  from	  a	  previous	  
round,	  as	  in	  the	  “Past”	  task.	  Because	  the	  strategy	  of	  the	  sender	  is	  held	  fixed,	  we	  can	  see	  
the	   direct	   impact	   of	   the	   information.	  We	   then	   have	   subjects	   play	   5	   more	   rounds	   as	  
before,	  but	  now	   the	   sender’s	   strategy	   can	  adjust	  –	   the	   sender	  knows	   the	   information	  
and	  knows	  the	  receiver	  knows	  the	  information	  too	  –	  so	  this	  part	  identifies	  the	  strategic	  
impact	  of	  the	  additional	  information.	  
The	   effect	   of	   information	   in	   the	   “Average	   Reports”	   task	   on	   X	   subjects	   from	   the	  
primary	  study,	  while	  slight,	   is	  actually	  to	  move	  receiver	  guesses	  further	  away	  from	  the	  
best	  response.	  Looking	  first	  at	  the	  direct	  effect,	  the	  guess	  of	  a	  past	  non-­‐reported	  secret	  
number	  increases	  over	  the	  mode	  guess	  from	  past	  rounds	  by	  0.117	  on	  average,	  but	  this	  
increase	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant	  (one-­‐sided	  t-­‐test,	  p=0.115).	  However,	  the	  addition	  
information	  did	  move	  guesses	  further	  from	  the	  best	  response.	  Before	  the	  information,	  
the	  mode	  guess	  from	  past	  rounds	  is	  0.55	  away	  from	  the	  best	  response	  on	  average,	  and	  
the	  after	  the	  information,	  the	  guess	  of	  a	  past	  round	  is	  0.7	  away	  from	  the	  best	  response	  
on	   average.	   This	   increase	   is	   statistically	   significant	   at	   a	   5%	   level	   (one-­‐sided	   t-­‐test,	  
p=0.0132).	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  Despite	   the	   deleterious	   direct	   impact	   on	   this	   information	   on	   beliefs,	   the	   rate	   of	  
disclosure	  for	  secret	  numbers	  of	  2	  actually	  increases	  slightly.	  In	  the	  5	  additional	  rounds,	  
the	  reporting	  rate	  of	  a	  secret	  number	  of	  2	  increases	  by	  6.1	  percentage	  points,	  but	  this	  
increase	  is	  statistically	  insignificant	  (one-­‐sided	  t-­‐test,	  p=0.3316).	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  effects	  of	  information	  in	  the	  “Consumer	  Reports”	  task	  on	  34	  
subjects	  from	  the	  primary	  study	  are	  to	  move	  choices	  closer	  to	  the	  best	  response	  and	  to	  
substantially	   increase	  disclosure	  –	   leading	  choices	  much	  closer	   to	  equilibrium.	  Looking	  
first	  at	  the	  direct	  effect,	  the	  guess	  of	  a	  past	  non-­‐reported	  secret	  number	  decreases	  from	  
the	  mode	  guess	  from	  past	  rounds	  by	  0.171	  on	  average,	  and	  this	  decrease	  is	  statistically	  
significant	  (one-­‐sided	  t-­‐test,	  p=0.0482).	  
In	  addition,	  the	  distribution	  of	  guesses	  shifts	  towards	  the	  best	  response.	  Before	  the	  
information,	  the	  mode	  guess	  from	  past	  rounds	  is	  0.724	  away	  from	  the	  best	  response	  on	  
average,	  and	  the	  after	  the	  information,	  the	  guess	  of	  a	  past	  round	  is	  0.553	  away	  from	  the	  
best	   response	   on	   average.	   This	   decrease	   is	   statistically	   significant	   at	   a	   5%	   level	   (one-­‐
sided	   t-­‐test,	   p=	   0.0108).	   The	   outcome	   of	   these	   changes	   is	   shown	   in	   Figure	   8,	   which	  
shows	  the	  histogram	  of	  the	  mode	  of	  guesses	  before	  the	  intervention	  and	  guesses	  of	  a	  
past	  round	  after	  the	  informational	  intervention.	  	  
Finally,	   in	   the	   5	   additional	   rounds,	   the	   reporting	   rate	   of	   a	   secret	   number	   of	   2	  
increased	   to	   73.9%	   from	   a	   reporting	   rate	   of	   45.5%	   in	   the	   previous	   40	   rounds.	   This	  
increase	  of	  28.5	  percentage	  points	  is	  statistically	  significant	  (one-­‐sided	  t-­‐test,	  p=0.005).	  
However,	  this	  rate	  did	  not	  increase	  appreciably	  over	  the	  5	  additional	  rounds,	  suggesting	  
that	   this	   information	   intervention	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   produce	   convergence	   to	   full	  
disclosure.	  From	  the	  first	  two	  rounds	  to	  the	  next	  three	  rounds,	  the	  reporting	  rate	  of	  a	  
secret	  number	  of	  2	   increased	   just	  6.9	  percentage	  points,	  which	  was	  not	  a	   statistically	  
significant	  increase	  (p=0.3615).	  
	  
5	   Robustness:	  Enlarged	  State	  Space	  
In	   many	   settings	   of	   verifiable	   disclosure,	   the	   size	   of	   the	   state	   space	   is	   under	   the	  
control	  of	  policy	  makers.	  For	  instance,	  restaurant	  hygiene	  can	  be	  reported	  on	  a	  scale	  of	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1-­‐5	  (as	  it	  is	  in	  some	  areas	  of	  the	  UK)	  or	  even	  1-­‐100	  (as	  it	  is	  in	  some	  areas	  of	  the	  US).	  To	  
get	   a	   sense	   for	   how	   the	   size	  of	   the	   state	   space	  might	   impact	  our	   findings,	  we	   ran	   an	  
experiment	   that	   was	   similar	   to	   our	   primary	   experiment,	   but	   with	   an	   enlarged	   state	  
space.	  
In	  this	  new	  experiment,	  the	  state	  space	  is	  S={1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10},	  which	  is	  twice	  as	  
large	   as	   in	   the	   original	   experiment.	   Here	   again	   we	   allow	   receivers	   to	   guess	   half-­‐unit	  
intervals,	  so	  the	  action	  space	  is	  A={1,1.5,2,2.5,…,9,9.5,10}.	  	  
To	  keep	  payoffs	  in	  a	  similar	  range	  to	  the	  original	  experiment,	  the	  distance	  from	  the	  
ideal	   action	   is	   divided	   in	   half	   in	   the	   payoff	   functions,	   so	   that	   receiver	   payoffs	   are	  𝐸𝐶𝑈! = 110− 20 (𝑆 − 𝐴)/2 !.! 	  and	   sender	   payoffs	   are	   𝐸𝐶𝑈! = 110− 20|(10−𝐴)/2|!.!.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  payoffs	  for	  senders	  and	  receivers	  when	  the	  receiver	  guesses	  4	  
and	  the	  state	  is	  2	  is	  the	  same	  in	  the	  new	  experiment	  as	  when	  the	  receiver	  guesses	  2	  and	  
the	  state	  is	  1	  in	  the	  original	  experiment.	  
Aside	  from	  increasing	  the	  set	  of	  secret	  numbers	  and	  changing	  the	  payoff	  table,	  the	  
experimental	   design	   and	   instructions	   are	   the	   same	   as	   in	   the	   original	   experiment.	  We	  
conducted	   this	  experiment	   in	   the	   same	   location	  as	  our	   replication	   study,	  which	   is	   the	  
Computer	  Lab	  for	  Experimental	  Research	  (CLER)	  facility	  at	  the	  Harvard	  Business	  School.	  
84	  subjects	  completed	  the	  new	  experiment,	  and	  the	  median	  and	  mode	  session	  size	  was	  
14	   subjects.	   In	   order	   to	  make	   this	   new	   experiment	  more	   directly	   comparable	   to	   our	  
primary	  study,	  we	  limited	  the	  subject	  pool	  to	  be	  25	  years	  old	  or	  younger.	  
	  
5.1	  Results	  
Figure	  9	  shows	  the	  average	  reporting	  rate	  by	  secret	  number	  in	  the	  new	  experiment.	  
As	   in	   the	   primary	   study	   with	   5	   secret	   numbers,	   the	   reporting	   rate	   increases	  
monotonically	  with	   the	  secret	  number.	  The	  reporting	   rate	   for	  a	  secret	  number	  of	  3	   in	  
the	   new	   experiment	   is	   41.8%,	  which	   is	   comparable	   to	   the	   reporting	   rate	   for	   a	   secret	  
number	  of	  2	  in	  the	  primary	  study	  of	  40.8%.	  They	  are	  also	  comparable	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  a	  
risk	   neutral	   sender	   is	   close	   to	   indifferent	   between	   reporting	   and	   not	   reporting	   at	   a	  
secret	  number	  of	  3	  in	  the	  new	  experiment.	  The	  average	  guess	  for	  a	  non-­‐reported	  secret	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number	   is	   3.239	   with	   a	   95%	   confidence	   interval	   of	   3.063	   to	   3.416.	   In	   addition,	   the	  
reporting	  rate	  in	  the	  new	  experiment	  for	  a	  secret	  number	  of	  5	  is	  85.7%,	  which	  is	  similar	  
to	  the	  reporting	  rate	  88.6%	  for	  a	  secret	  number	  of	  3	  in	  the	  primary	  study.	  	  
As	   Figure	   10	   shows,	   there	   is	   also	   heterogeneity	   in	   receiver	   responses	   in	   the	   new	  
experiment:	  12.1%	  of	  subjects	  make	  the	  equilibrium	  guess	  of	  1,	  19.0%	  of	  subjects	  (the	  
largest	   percentage)	   guess	   2,	   13.5%	   guess	   2.5,	   and	   11.3%	   guess	   5.	   For	   a	   risk	   neutral	  
receiver,	  the	  best	  response	  is	  to	  guess	  the	  average	  non-­‐reported	  secret	  number,	  which	  
is	  2.503	  with	  a	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  of	  2.353	  to	  2.653.	  This	  is	  far	  below	  the	  average	  
guess	  from	  receivers	  in	  the	  experiment	  (3.239	  with	  a	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  of	  3.063	  
to	  3.416).	   	  Once	  again,	  we	  find	  evidence	  of	   little	   learning	  or	  stochasticity	   in	  choice	  for	  
receivers.	  Using	  an	  ANOVA	  test,	  we	  find	  that	  just	  3.7%	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  guesses	  occurs	  
over	  rounds,	  while	  72.8%	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  guesses	  occurs	  across	  subjects.	  
	  
5.2	  Informational	  Interventions	  
In	  half	   of	   the	   sessions	  of	   the	  new	  experiment,	   subjects	   completed	   the	   “Consumer	  
Reports”	   additional	   task,	   and	   in	   the	   other	   half	   subjects	   completed	   the	   “Average	  
Reports”	  additional	  task.	  Once	  again,	  we	  found	  the	  former	  able	  to	  move	  beliefs,	  but	  not	  
the	  later.	  	  
Looking	   first	   at	   the	  direct	  effect	  of	   “Average	  Reports”,	  we	   find	   that	   the	  difference	  
between	   the	  mode	  guess	   and	   the	  best	   response	   is	   1.211	  before	   the	   information,	   and	  
1.184	  after	   the	   intervention,	  which	   is	  not	   significantly	  different	   (two-­‐sided	   t-­‐test,	  p=0.	  
895).	   However,	   the	   “Consumer	   Reports”	   intervention	   is	   able	   to	   improve	   guesses	  
substantially.	   The	   difference	   from	   the	   best	   response	   is	   1.544	   before	   the	   intervention	  
and	  1.111	  after	  the	  invention,	  which	  is	  significantly	  different	  (two-­‐sided	  t-­‐test,	  p=0.	  001)	  
	  	  
6	   Discussion	  and	  Conclusions	  
Our	   findings	   demonstrate	   that	   -­‐	   in	   contrast	   with	   the	   unraveling	   hypothesis	   -­‐	   full	  
disclosure	   does	   not	   occur	   even	   in	   an	   extremely	   simple	   situation	   in	   which	   all	   of	   the	  
institutional	  assumptions	  of	  unraveling	  are	  satisfied.	  The	  failure	  steps	  from	  the	  fact	  that	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receivers	   do	   not	   infer	   that	   no	   news	   is	   bad	   news,	   despite	   knowing	   the	   distribution	   of	  
quality	  scores	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  senders	  have	  chosen	  not	  to	  reveal	  information.	  
Our	   findings	   cannot	   be	   explained	   by	   the	   typical	   disclosure	   theories	   with	   rational	  
agents.	  By	  design,	  we	  removed	  possibilities	  such	  as	  disclosure	  costs,	  strategic	  concerns,	  
sender	  claims	  not	  to	  know	  the	  true	  state,	  and	  receiver’s	  lack	  of	  information	  on	  potential	  
states	  from	  our	  experimental	  design.	  We	  also	  rule	  out	  random	  choice,	  risk	  aversion,	  and	  
social	  preferences	  as	  potential	  explanations.	   	  
Our	   findings	  generate	  potential	   remedies	   to	   the	   failure	  of	  unraveling.	  As	   shown	   in	  
Forsythe,	   Isaac	   and	   Palfrey	   (1989),	   Forsythe,	   Lundholm	   and	   Rietz	   (1999),	   and	   in	   our	  
additional	   experiments,	   full	   disclosure	   occurs	   when	   the	   experimenter	   shows	   the	  
receiver	   the	   true	   state	   after	   each	   round	   of	   her	   guess.	   However,	   such	   a	   full	   feedback	  
remedy	   is	   very	  difficult	   to	   implement	   in	   reality,	   as	   it	   takes	   time	  and	  effort	   for	   a	   third	  
party	  to	  find	  out	  the	  truth	  and	  it	  is	  costly	  to	  convey	  the	  truth	  to	  the	  receiver	  in	  a	  precise	  
and	  timely	  manner.	  	  
A	   more	   practical	   remedy	   is	   to	   provide	   a	   summary	   of	   reported	   states	   (like	   our	  
“Average	   Reports”	   task)	   or	   a	   summary	   of	   reported	   and	   unreported	   states	   (like	   our	  
“Consumer	   Reports”	   task).	   As	   shown	   above,	   the	   “Average	   Reports”	   intervention	   has	  
little	  direct	  effect	  on	  beliefs.	  In	  fact,	  it	  makes	  some	  receivers	  even	  more	  optimistic	  than	  
before	   about	   non-­‐disclosing	   senders.	   Also,	   our	   results	   suggest	   that	   an	   “Average	  
Reports”	   intervention	   fails	   to	   move	   the	   market	   towards	   unraveling.	   Ironically,	   more	  
information	  by	  the	  “Average	  Reports”	  intervention	  may	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  reduce	  the	  
transparency	  of	  voluntary	  disclosure.	  	  
In	   contrast,	   the	   “Consumer	   Reports”	   intervention	  makes	   receivers	  more	   skeptical	  
about	   non-­‐disclosure	   and	   therefore	   pushes	   the	   market	   towards	   the	   unraveling	  
equilibrium.	   This	   confirms	   our	   conclusion	   that	   the	   failure	   of	   unraveling	   is	   driven	   by	  
receivers’	   incorrect	   beliefs	   about	   non-­‐disclosure.	   It	   also	   suggests	   that	   voluntary	  
disclosure	   must	   be	   accompanied	   by	   extra	   information	   about	   non-­‐disclosed	   states	   in	  
order	  to	  foster	  full	  disclosure.	  However,	  this	  intervention	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  full	  disclosure	  
in	   the	   laboratory.	   The	   optimal	   intervention	   will	   depend	   on	   weighing	   the	   cost	   of	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producing	  extra	  information	  and	  the	  benefits	  of	  closing	  the	  gap	  in	  beliefs	  and	  disclosure	  
rates.	  	  
Our	   study	   has	   several	   limitations.	   The	   subjects	   in	   our	   main	   experiments	   are	  
undergraduate	  students	  at	  New	  York	  University,	  who	  may	  not	  be	  representative	  of	  the	  
average	  population	  targeted	  by	  a	  voluntary	  disclosure	  policy.	  However,	  we	  might	  expect	  
people	   with	   some	   college	   education	   to	   be	   more	   sophisticated	   than	   the	   average	  
population	  in	  the	  US.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  unraveling	  shown	  in	  our	  data	  may	  
be	  a	  conservative	  estimation	  of	  what	  would	  happen	  in	  a	  real	  market.	  In	  addition,	  we	  are	  
able	   to	   replicate	   our	   results	   with	   a	   subject	   pool	   that	   contains	   a	   mixture	   of	   ages	   at	  
another	   university,	   suggesting	   that	   the	   failure	   to	   perceive	   no	   news	   as	   bad	   news	   is	  
widespread.	  	  
In	  addition,	  human	  subjects	  may	  not	  act	  as	  a	   firm	  does,	  which	  may	  cause	  some	  to	  
question	   the	   generalizability	   of	   our	   results.	   However,	   in	   many	   settings	   disclosure	  
decisions	  are	  undertaken	  by	  small	  firms,	  such	  as	  sole	  proprietorships,	  so	  human	  subjects	  
may	   be	   suitable	   replacement	   for	   firms.	   For	   example,	   one	  might	   think	   of	   a	   family-­‐run	  
restaurant	   deciding	  whether	   to	   disclose	   its	   hygiene	   inspection	   grade.	   In	   addition,	   the	  
results	   from	   our	   “Computer”	   task	   indicate	   that	   failures	   of	   unraveling	   can	   occur	   even	  
when	  senders	  are	  not	  susceptible	  to	  any	  behavioral	  biases	  or	  mistakes.	  Although	  there	  
is	  evidence	  that	  large	  firms	  do	  not	  perfectly	  maximize	  profits,	   it	  seems	  likely	  that	  their	  
choices	  lay	  somewhere	  between	  the	  decisions	  of	  a	  single	  undergraduate	  student	  and	  a	  
perfectly	  optimizing	  computer.	  
The	  third	  limitation	  is	  that,	  by	  design,	  we	  do	  not	  know	  how	  bad	  inferences	  interact	  
with	   other	   rational	   factors	   that	   impede	   full	   disclosure.	   Will	   bad	   inferences	   have	   a	  
greater	   impact	   on	   disclosure	   rate	   when	   disclosure	   is	   costly	   or	   when	   senders	   have	   a	  
choice	   to	   learn	   the	   true	   state?	  Will	   the	   “Average	   Reports”	   and	   “Consumer	   Reports”	  
interventions	   motivate	   more	   disclosure	   when	   disclosure	   is	   costly?	   These	   questions	  
warrant	  future	  research.	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Figure	  2:	  Fraction	  of	  rounds	  each	  secret	  number	  was	  reported	   in	  the	  replication	  study	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Figure	  3:	  Histogram	  of	  receiver	  guesses	  of	  non-­‐reported	  secret	  numbers	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Figure	  5:	  The	  average	  guess	  of	  non-­‐reported	  secret	  numbers	  by	  block	  of	  5	  rounds	  (with	  
95%	  confidence	  intervals	  and	  the	  average	  guess	  across	  all	  rounds)	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6:	  The	  frequency	  of	  guesses	   for	   the	  reporting	  rate	  at	  each	  secret	  number	   (with	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Figure	  7:	  The	  implied	  belief	  of	  the	  average	  non-­‐disclosed	  number	  and	  the	  average	  guess	  
of	  the	  non-­‐disclosed	  number	  (with	  the	  average	  non-­‐disclosed	  number)	  
	  
	  
Figure	  8:	  The	  histogram	  of	  mode	  guesses	  of	  non-­‐reported	  secret	  before	  the	  “Consumer	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Figure	   9:	   Fraction	   of	   rounds	   each	   secret	   number	   was	   reported	   in	   the	   robustness	  
experiment	  (with	  95%	  confidence	  intervals)	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Appendix:	  Experimental	  Instructions	  
 
Welcome	  
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-making, and you will be paid for your 
participation in cash, privately at the end of the experiment. What you earn depends partly on 
your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. 
Please silence and put away your cellular phones now.  
The entire session will take place through your computer terminal. Please do not talk or in any 
way communicate with other participants during the session. 
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period you will be given a 
description of the main features of the experiment and will be shown how to use the computers. If 
you have any questions during this period, raise your hand and your question will be answered so 
everyone can hear. 
Instructions 
The experiment you are participating in consists of 45 rounds. At the end of the final round, you 
will complete an additional task, be asked to fill out a questionnaire, and then will be paid the total 
amount you have accumulated during the course of the session (in addition to the $5 show up 
fee). Everybody will be paid in private. You are under no obligation to tell others how much you 
earned. 
The currency used during these 45 rounds is what we call “Experimental Currency Units” (ECU). 
For your final payment, your earnings during these 45 rounds will be converted into US dollars at 
the ratio of 200:1 (200 ECU=$1). They will then be rounded up to the nearest (non-negative) 
dollar amount. 
In the first round, you will be matched with one other person, and you are equally likely to be 
matched with any other person in the room. You will not know whom you are matched with, nor 
will the person who is matched with you. One of you will be assigned to be S Player and the other 
to be the R Player for that round. You are equally likely to be assigned to either role. In the 
second round, you will once again be randomly matched with one other person (most likely with a 
different person than in the first round) and randomly assigned a role, and this will be repeated 
until 45 rounds are complete. 
In each round and for every pair, the computer program will generate a secret number that is 
randomly drawn from the set {1,2,3,4,5}. The computer will then send the secret number to the S 
Player. After receiving this number, the S Player will choose whether or not to report the secret 
number to the R Player. If the S Player chooses to report the number, the R Player will receive 
this message from the S Player: “The number I received is” followed by the actual secret number. 
Otherwise, the R Player will receive no message. 
After seeing the message or not, the R Player will guess the value of the secret number. The 
earnings of both players depend on the value of the secret number and the R Player’s guess. 
The specific earnings are shown in the table below, which is displayed again before the S Player 
and R Player make their choices. In each cell of the table, the payoff for the S Player is on the 
left, and the payoff for the R Player is on the right. As you can see from the table, the S Player 
earns more when the R Player makes a higher guess, and the R Player earns more when their 
guess is closer to the secret number.  
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